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I: Introduction 
One of the notable features of JM Coetzee's work is the portrayal in his novels, 
particularly in his 1999 Booker Prize-winning novel, Disgrace, of worlds that often seem 
bleak and bereft of redemption. In this dissertation I will argue that there is a resonance 
in Coetzee's writing that goes beyond the political and historical and that adds another 
dimension to his work. The focus of my dissertation will be an attempt to account for this 
other 'dimension' within the broader socio-political-historical nexus that informs much of 
his work. I will argue that this other dimension represents an ongoing conccrn with the 
questions of redemption and salvation, particularly as they are manifested in his latcr 
works, Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello. These concerns, however, are not just a 
consequence of Coetzee's evolving thought. As I will show, they are present in his 
earlier texts as well. To this end, I will consider the ways in which the themes of 
redemption and salvation, in the specifically religious and Christian sense of these words, 
also resonate in In the Heart of the Country (1977) and Life and Times of Michael K 
(1983). 
JM Coetzee's Disgrace has generated a great deal of controvcrsy and criticism, 
particularly for its undeniably bleak, pessimistic view of the new South Africa and for its 
perceived racism. In this novel, a white woman, Lucy Lurie, is attacked and raped by 
three black men, who also kill all the dogs that she cares for. It is this particular incident 
in the novel, the depiction of black-on-white violence, that has drawn the most criticism, 
being viewed, on the one hand, as something which plays on white fears of black 
retaliation for apartheid, and on the other hand, as something which supports racist 
stereotypes about black violence. 
On 5 April 2000, Coetzee's Disgrace was referred to in the ANC's submission to the 
Human Rights Commission's Inquiry into Racism in the Media (Attwell: 2002:332). The 
then Minister of Public Enterprises, Jeff Radebe, concluded the submission by saying 
that: 
JM Coetzee makes the point that five years after liberation white South African society 
continues to believe in a particular stereotype of the African which defines the latter as 
immoral and amoral, a savage, violent, disrespectful of private property, incapable of 
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refinement through education and driven by ... dark satanic impulses (quoted In 
Attwell,2002:334). 
According to Shane Moran: 
Coetzee, in his destruction, gives a fiercely one-dimensional indictment of the 
inhumanity of post-apartheid South Africa that inevitably feeds into the trough of 
gleeful pessimism that nourishes opponents of black governance (2001:226). 
Mitchell and Gordin (2003) refer to a review in The Economist which takes the view that 
the thesis of many post-liberation South African novels such as Disgrace is that "South 
Africa run by Africans is going to hell in a handbasket" (p I). Georgina Horrell (2000) 
sees the debate surrounding Disgrace as centring on what Coetzee's intentions in this 
novel are whether they endorse the acceptance of whites' subordination in post-1994 
South Africa, or whether it is " ... a reactionary expression of white liberal disaffection 
and complaint" (p26). Michiel Heyns quotes Anna Christensen in the Financial Mail as 
referring to Disgrace as " ... a dark, nihilistic tour de force that clashes with the reality 
and the intent of what I have come to believe South Africa represents", and that its likely 
effect on white South Africans will be to send them" ... hobbling off to the Australian 
embassy for immigration forms" (p5?). According to Michael Kochin, Disgrace is a 
highly disturbing novel " ... because it seems to present a world dying without hope" 
(2004:4). Jason Cowley calls the worldview of Disgrace "extraordinarily despairing" 
(1999: 19), arguing that Lucy's comment about being prepared to live like a dog, "with no 
cards, no weapons, no property rights, no dignity", constitutes a pivotal moment in the 
text, one that offers a clue to Coetzee's vision of the future of South Africa. For Grant 
Farred, "The condition of abjection, of fallenness, of social and political failure ... 
dominates Coetzee's 1999 Booker Prize-winning novel" (2002), and for Rita Barnard, "A 
crisis of definitions, relationships, and responsibilities lies at the heart of Coetzee's 
troubling new novel ... " (2002: 385). However, Gareth Cornwell points out that the 
novel is also uplifting in the sense that David Lurie's acceptance of disgrace as his state 
of being" ... is the first step towards salvation, the recovery of grace" (1999:248). Derek 
Attridge (2002) sums up the controversy that surrounds this text: 
2 
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Coetzee is either praised (implicitly or explicitly) for unblinkingly depicting the lack of 
progress South Africa has made towards its declared goal of a non-racial, non-sexist 
democracy ... or condemned for painting a one-sidedly negative picture of post-
apartheid South Africa, representing blacks as rapists and thieves, and implying that 
whites have no option but to submit to their assaults. (p317) 
Coetzee himself, however, is not insensible to these concerns. In an essay on 
Breytenbach's Dog Heart, which features attacks on whites in the countryside of the new 
South Africa, Coetzee shows himself to be fully aware of the ramifications of depicting 
post-apartheid black-on-white violence: 
These stories make disturbing reading not only because of the psychopathic violence of 
the attacks themselves, but because they are being repeated at all. For the circulation of 
horror stories is the very mechanism that drives white paranoia about being chased off the 
land and ultimately into the sea. Why does Breytenbach lend himself to the process? 
(2001:312) 
Coetzee's tone and comments in the above extract are not commensurate with an attitude 
that would uncritically endorse the fuelling of white paranoia or contribute to a discourse 
of right-wing racism, as the accusation alleges in the ANC's submission to the Human 
Rights Commission on Racism in the Media. Furthermore, as David Attwell points out in 
his article, "Race in Disgrace", the way in which race is dealt with in the novel is far less 
one-dimensional than the criticism of the novel would imply. Attwell argues, for 
example, that Manas Mathabane, the Professor of Religious Studies and part of the 
committee set up to deal with the sexual harassment charge against David Lurie, is the 
one most dedicated to fairness and procedure and that his general attitude is one of 
forgiveness, reminiscent of the presence of the clergy at the TRC (2002:335). As for the 
theft of Lurie's car and various other items, it is not the racial character of the thieves that 
Lurie reflects on, but the question of the redistribution of material goods that is pondered 
(p336). Also, in his attempts to console Lucy, it is history, rather than race, that produces 
the conditions for violence and ultimately the attack on his daughter (p337). 
Nevertheless, this horrifying attack, as well as the brutal killing of the dogs and the 
attempt to set fire to Lurie, contribute to the overall pessimistic, bleak character of the 
3 
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noveL When one adds to this the events leading up to Lurie's forced resignation from the 
university, the picture becomes ever more disheartening. Lucy Graham (2002), argues 
that the world that is presented in Disgrace is one that is characterised by "the absence of 
grace" (p4), a position that I will argue for in this dissertation. I would argue further that 
it is this very characteristic that foregrounds the need for a measure of redemption in the 
society depicted in Coetzee's novel. 
The notions of redemption and salvation are most often linked with the Christian teaching 
that man may be delivered from sin or saved from evil by the death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ. According to Georg Simmel (1997), each person contains within 
him/herself the seed of hisiher own regeneration. The soul's salvation entails discovering 
the 'divine' in ourselves, the part of ourselves that will satisfy all our ultimate longings 
"in terms of its yearning for transcendence and fulfilment, stature and strength" (p29). 
This fulfilment of our inner being is, according to Simmel, what constitutes the essence of 
the soul's salvation. Revealing this inner core is the task of each individual. Simmel 
argues that inherent in the Christian concept of salvation is the idea that" ... each person 
should make the most of his own talent" (1997 :34). Thus, the salvation of the soul" ... 
depends on each and every person's wresting from himself the most personal and unique 
elements of his being" (1997:35). 
In Coetzee's texts there is no simple recourse to salvation. His characters do not speak 
the language of Christianity and Christ's love; they do, however, often demonstrate the 
need for a life that contains the presence of something spiritual, or a world that is in need 
of something beyond the material and corporeal and the historical and politieal. 
Furthermore, Coetzee's eharacters inhabit complex worlds weighted by socio-political 
concerns. His characters thus have to negotiate their personal needs within a context that 
is often fraught with difficulties and complications. Derek Attridge comments that the 
value that most deeply informs Disgrace is "a profound need to preserve the integrity of 
the self' (2000: 109). Sue Kossew views events in Disgrace as a complex interaction 
between private and public worlds, in particular, public disgrace versus individual grace 
or salvation (2003: 155). Elizabeth Costello says of her vegetarianism that "It comes out 
of a desire to save my soul" (Coetzee, 2003:89) and Magda, in the early part of In the 
Heart of the Country, asks: "How shall I be saved?" (HC: 16). In short, Coetzee's 
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characters frequently demonstrate the need for salvation in some form or other, although 
they do not necessarily phrase their needs in overt religious terms. 
The spiritual impulse in Coetzee's characters is manifested in varied ways, in some ways 
obviously Christian, in other ways denoting what I would call a generic spirituality. I 
would argue that these characters often have particular ways of being in the world that 
are, at root, religious, or that denote a spiritual condition or orientation. While Blanche 
(Sister Bridget) in Elizabeth Costello demonstrates the Christian ethic of love and 
sacrifice for others by devoting her life to God and caring for the sick and dying at 
Marianhill hospital, Michael K's reverence for the land and the pumpkins that he grows 
turns the cliche of being close to nature into something akin to a profound state of grace. 
The Magistrate's washing of the barbarian girl's feet in Waiting for the Barbarians also 
evokes an obvious comparison with the biblical story in which Jesus washes his disciples' 
feet during the last supper in order to teach them humility and service. The disciples do 
not understand why Jesus has washed their feet until he explains to them: "Do you know 
what I have done to you? 13y ou call me Teacher and Lord; and you are right, for so I 
am. 14If I then, your Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, you also ought to wash 
one another's feet. 15Por I have given you an example, that you should also do as I have 
done to you" (John, 13: 12-15). Humility and service can be seen as fundamental virtues 
in Christian life, and in Waiting for the Barbarians, the Magistrate's washing of the 
Barbarian girl's feet can be seen, at one level, as demonstrating his need to distance 
himself from the Empire and Colonel Joll's atrocities towards the barbarians, however 
much it might otherwise smack of fetishism and even perverse sexual practices. 
Defining religion or the modally religious man or woman is not a straightforward task 
because religions, as well as religious feelings, experiences and opinions, vary so widely. 
Both the South African Pocket Ox ford Dictionary (1994) and the Collins Paperback 
English Dictionary (1995) define religion as: the belief in a supernatural power or 
powers which are considered to be divine or stemming from God, or as a particular 
system of faith and worship. Similarly, the Penguin English Dictionary (2003) defines 
religion as: the organised service and worship of a god, gods. or the supernatural; 
personal commitment or devotion to religious faith or observance. and a cause. principle 
or system of beliefs held to with ardour and faith; something considered to be of supreme 
importance. A somewhat different interpretation of religion is that given by C. Daniel 
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Batson et aI, who offer a definition of religion that focuses on existential questions. 
According to them, religion is: 
Whatever we as individuals do to come to grips personally with the questions that 
confront us because we are aware that we and others like us are alive and that we will die 
(1993:8). 
Religion from this perspective can be described as something whose character is 
metaphysical, relating to our need to understand questions bound up with our existential 
awareness. Thus, according to Batson et al (and germane to this study), a lack of interest 
in formal, institutional religion does not mean a lack of interest in religious questions; on 
the contrary, while someone may not conform to the stereotyped notion of what 
constitutes a religious person, they may nonetheless have an intense interest in religious 
concerns (1993:156). 
One aspect of religion that is stressed by Batson et al as being an intrinsic part of religion 
is that of moral thinking, which can be better understood within a framework of Lawrence 
Kohlberg's stages of moral development. According to Kohlberg's theory, there are 
essentially three levels of moral development -- preconventional morality, conventional 
morality and postconventional morality, with each level consisting of two stages. The 
preconventional level involves mostly young children, and is the level at which moral 
judgments are made solely on the basis of whatever brings pain or pleasure. The latter is 
ajudged good; the former bad. At the conventional level, moral decisions are made on the 
basis of what others or society expect, and so involves upholding the rules and laws of 
society, just because they are society'S rules and laws. At the final level, that of 
postconventional morality (stages 5 and 6), moral judgments are made on the basis of the 
underlying principles of justice, equality and rights, regardless of whether or not those 
principles are endorsed by society. In terms of our mora) development, Kohlberg argues 
that, while we all begin at Stage 1, most of us only progress as far as Stage 4 in our 
lifetime. For him, "Stage 5 is unusual, Stage 6 extremely rare" (Batson et aI, 1993: 62). 
Insofar as Coetzee' s characters are often estranged from or at odds with their social 
environments, it is frequently because their behaviour and actions do not conform to what 
is expected. They often display behaviour that corresponds to Kohlberg's conception of 
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postconventional morality in that they act in terms of their own ideas of right and wrong. 
Michael K's rejection of the camps; Magda's increasingly desperate attempts to break. 
down the master-servant relationship between herself and the servants on the farm; the 
Magistrate's decision to help the barbarians after they have been tortured and to return the 
barbarian girl to her people after her torture; David Lurie's intervention after the dogs 
have been killed to save the honour of their corpses by acting to ensure that they are not 
further brutalised; and the intensity of Elizabeth Costello's feelings about animals - all 
mark them as standing outside the boundaries of what is considered appropriate behaviour 
within their particular contexts. As for the Magistrate's decision to help the barbarians 
despite the danger to himself, to "choose the side of justice when it is not in [his] material 
interest to do so" (Doubling the Point, p 394), this is because the Magistrate acts out of 
the conviction (according to Coetzee), that " ... we are born with the idea of justice" 
(Coetzee, 1997: 395). 
The way in which Coetzee' s characters respond to the conditions of their existence 
corresponds closely to Gordon W. Allport's conception of a mature religion. According 
to him, all that qualifY as such comprise three parts: firstly, they deal with complex 
problems like ethical responsibility and evil; secondly, they involve a readiness to doubt 
and be critical; and, thirdly, they are open-ended in that they are tentative and incomplete 
and so incorporate an on-going search for answers (Batson, et aI, 1997: 166). According 
to Allport, "We may then say that the mature religious sentiment is ordinarily fashioned 
in the workshop of doubt" (1950:83). Ethical concerns are a prominent feature of 
Coetzee's texts and his characters frequently display a great deal of self-doubt and 
tentativeness about what they do. The agony and trauma that Elizabeth undergoes as a 
result of her feelings of compassion for animals are testimony to hcr stance outside and 
beyond the conventional categories of morality to the extent that she feels herself entirely 
alienated even from the people she loves, turning to her son, John, in despair, and asking 
him why it is that she cannot come to terms with a situation that everyone else seems to 
have accepted. Her anguish is such that she wonders whether it is not perhaps she herself 
who is deluded: "Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of them are participants in a crime of 
stupefYing proportions? Am I fantasizing it all? I must be mad!" (Elizabeth Costello, 
pl14). Allport argues further that when religion comprises these three characteristics 
they are related to "increased compassion, decreased intolerance and increased sensitivity 
to the needs of others (Batson, et ai, 1997:370). 
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In the texts that I consider in this dissertation, it will be argued that, while Coetzee's 
novels obviously deal to a large extent with postcolonial issues the quandaries created 
by characters who perforce must live in time, in history embedded in them also is an 
impulse toward religion or spirituality that moves his work towards transhistorical terms, 
and that these spiritual flickerings become ever stronger in later texts. 
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II 
The theme of salvation is a recurrent one in earlier Coetzee works like In the Heart of the 
Country. Magda's yearning throughout this novel is to live in community with others, 
and her condition of alienation from those around her creates a life from which she wants 
to be redeemed. 
In his book To have or to be? Erich Fromm argues that the desire to experience 
connectedness with others is one of the strongest motivators of human behaviour 
(1976:107). In Catholic theology, the definition of 'Hell' is a mode of existence 
characterized by the absence of such connection, by an estrangement from others 
(Fromm, 1976:124). Magda's existence in In the Heart of the Country is characterized by 
just such an absence of connection with others, hence her desperate attempts to befriend 
Hendrik and Klein-Anna and to communicate with the sky-gods. 
Magda in In the Heart of the Country yearns to live in a state of reciprocity with others 
and her environment, but is unable to do so because she is a settler-colonial, and this 
marks all her relations with others and the world around her, relations that are based 
essentially on exploiting the labour of others and exploiting the land and animals on the 
farm. All of Magda's transgressions are aimed at disrupting this status quo, thereby 
changing the relations that exist into ones that are more equitable and humane. In In the 
Heart of the Country, the relation between self and other is characterised by struggle and 
antagonism and can be understood within the framework of Sartre's notion of Being-for-
others. For Sartre, the foundation of the relation of the self to the other is that the I is 
always an object for the other, and that when the other looks at me, "... suddenly I 
experience a subtle alienation of all my possibilities, which are now associated with 
objects of the world, far from me, in the midst of the world" (Warnock, 1965:76). 
According to Warnock, for Sartre there are two consequences of being objectified by the 
other in this way. Firstly, it is that T become a thing, and, secondly, the other's 
judgment of me enslaves me because it detracts from my mastery of the situation. The 
only way in which I can defend myself is by trying to destroy the freedom of the other by 
making a thing of him (1965:78-9). For Sartre, conflict and struggle are the defining 
characteristics of our relationship with others. Yet, it is this that Magda resists. She has 
intimations of a different way of being. 
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Martin Buber's I and Thou (1970) gives deeper insight into the urgency and intensity of 
Magda's quest and helps explain why she is so determined to not just accept and continue 
with her life. 
In Martin Buber's I and Thou he establishes a relation of oneness between I and You that 
goes back to what he calls the 'basic' word. According to him, basic words do not stand 
on their own; rather, they always form a word pair, one of which is 1- You, the other I-It 
(1970:53). The I never stands on its own, but is always part of either of the basic word 
pairs I-You or I-It. The difference between the two basic word pairs is that when one 
speaks the basic word I-You, one speaks with one's whole being, whereas the basic word 
I-It does not constitute the same type of wholeness (Buber, 1970:54). 
The I on its own, just as the You on its own, cannot produce a whole being; what is 
needed for the I to become is a You, so that "becoming I, I say You" (p62). The essence, 
then, of the I-You relation is one of reciprocity. It is through the You that the I becomes 
possible. When the You is spoken to another human being using the basic word I-You, a 
relation of reciprocity is established that makes the objectification of the other, or a 
turning of the other into a thing, impossible. Walter Kaufmann, in the introduction to I 
and Thou, argues that there is a religious connotation in Buber's definition of You, in that 
to merely use or experience another being is to deny God, but that in encountering rather 
than turning away from You is to encounter God (p28). According to Buber, it is by 
grace, not seeking, that the You is encountered by me (p62). This lends the I-You relation 
a feeling of sacredness, of that which brings one closer to God. Hence, according to 
B uber, " ... the longing for relation is primary" «p 78). 
In an analysis of' Ballad van de Gasfitter', Coetzee elucidates the problem of reciprocity: 
... the existential incompleteness of the I is at the root of Martin Buber's myth of a 
primal I Thou relation. The "primary word", says Buber, is not I, but I Thou, the 
word of natural combination denoting a relation between I and You antedating the 
objectification of You into It and the isolation of the I . .. .Intimations of the lost relation 
... inspire our efforts to reconstitute again and again the 'between' of the primal I 
Thou (1992:72). 
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The search for reciprocity can be seen as an attempt to redress in some measure the 
alienation of the self by engaging in relations that will undercut the objectification of the 
'other'. According to Strauss (1994:384), the scientific pursuit of knowledge in Western 
civilization has entailed an "objectification of the world in order to know it (and hence to 
control it)", so that relations of reciprocity with the world are severed. The will to know, 
understand, and hence to master the world, has resulted in an inevitable alienation from it. 
Similarly, the sUbjugation of people that goes with colonialism has entailed a severing of 
relations of reciprocity between human beings. The creation of master-servant 
relationships subverts relationships between people and creates its own pathology. In 
South Africa, as in many other colonised countries, colonialism has been inextricably 
linked with race, culminating eventually in the institutionalisation of apartheid as official 
state policy by the Nationalist government in 1948. It is this history, both pre- and post-
1948, that Coetzee's protagonists attempt to transcend in their quest for reciprocity. 
However, their positions of marginality and alienation from their environments point to a 
recognition of the inherent chasm between the self and other; hence the elusiveness of 
their quests. 
The sense of being displaced is one of the resonant themes of Coetzee's work; it is the 
way in which he registers the lack of reciprocity that underpins South African society and 
that, post-I 994, continues to exert a compelling force that undercuts the ideals of 
transformation and equality. The sense of desolation and emptiness that characterises this 
novelist's work can be linked to the failure of reciprocity - both social and historical -
that informs his texts. Coetzee also, however, offers glimpses of a different history, a 
way of re-imagining the future that circumvents the impasses created by history. 
In his Jerusalem Prize' Acceptance Speech', JM Coetzee commented: "In a society of 
masters and slaves, no one is free" (Doubling the Point, p97). In the Heart of the 
Countly explores this lack of freedom by locating its core in the alienation between the 
Self and Other that results from colonialism. The novel's protagonist, Magda, struggles 
to resist the colonial structures of patriarchy and master-servant relations within which 
she lives to assert a narrative of equality and a lived experiential equality. Her historical 
and social conditions, however, negate this. She is alienated from both her father and the 
servants by the historically specific subject positions that they each occupy. Her position 
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as master/mistress of the house is made possible only by the subject-position of the 
servants, because, as Canepari-Labib, (invoking Hegel), comments: " ... the Master 
always needs a Servant in order to be recognised as Master ... " (2000: 113). The 
pathological underside of this position, however, is elucidated by Magda, who sees the 
damaging consequences to her own humanity - subjugating others is to diminish yourself 
as well: "I, who living among the downcast have never beheld myself in the equal regard 
of another's eye, have never held another in the equal regard of mine" (HC: 8). This is 
what Magda means when she says to Klein-Anna that: "I have never learned to talk with 
another person ... I have never known words of true exchange, Anna. The words I give 
you you cannot give back. They are words without value" (HC: 101). It is this debased 
condition in which Magda lives that she rebels against. Her recognition that "It is not 
speech that makes man man but the speech of others" (HC: 126) reveals the necessity, to 
humanness, of exchange with others. Where this exchange is compromised, part of what 
makes us human is, consequently, damaged. Both Magda and her father inhabit a space 
that is, in this sense, corrupted. Magda, however, recognises and rejilses to inhabit such a 
space. She becomes a figure of anomaly because of her refusal to comply with the 
accepted codes and conventions of her environment. 
JM Coetzee situates In the Heart of the Country within a tradition of pastoral literature in 
South Africa. In an analysis of the role of pastoral art in South Africa, Coetzee argues 
that, to the West, the pastoral fulfils two functions: it personifies the virtues of 
civilization, the "garden in bloom against the garden in decay, the garden degenerating 
into wilderness" (1988:3), but must also justify colonialism and retreat from the city. In 
order to do these, it must portray white labour, with the result that the presence of the 
black man becomes "embarrassing and difficult" and "the black man becomes a shadowy 
presence flitting across the stage now and then" (1988:5). Albeit only in part, Coetzee's 
In the Heart of the CountlY undermines this conception of the pastoral in South Africa by 
creating an environment that subverts the pastoral genre. The farm on which Magda lives 
is a desert-like wilderness, a landscape impenetrable to her attempts to speak it. This 
conception of the landscape conforms to one of the dream topographies that Coetzee 
identifies as belonging to South Africa, one in which the "landscape remains alien, 
impenetrable, until a language is found in which to win it, speak it, represent it" (1988:7). 
The central question in this conception of the landscape is whether Africa is amenable in 
any way to being spoken to by people of European identity. Coetzee argues that the 
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historical failure to find such a language is a result of the failure to imagine Africa as a 
place that is peopled, and hence to engage with the landscape in its social and historical 
complexity. Instead, the pastoral isolates "a territory 'outside' history where the 
disturbing realities of land and labour can be bracketed off ... " (1988:9). 
According to Coetzee, white South Africans' love for South Africa" ... has consistently 
been directed toward the land, that is, toward what is least likely to respond to love: 
mountains and deserts, birds and animals and flowers" (1992:97). In the Heart of the 
Country exposes the emptiness of this love by foregrounding love in its narrative. In 
reflecting on Magda's need to engage in relations of reciprocity with those around her, in 
particular the servants, Coetzee argues that: 
... her passion is ... the love for South Africa (not just South Africa the rocks and bushes 
and mountains and plains but the country and its people), of which there has not been 
enough on the part of the European colonists and their descendants not enough in 
intensity, not enough in all-embracingness. (1992:61) 
In opposition to the traditional pastoral narrative, she posits a counter-narrative of 
reciprocity when she recollects that: 
At the feet of an old man I have drunk in a myth of a past when beast and man and master 
lived a common life as innocent as the stars in the sky, and I am far from laughing 
(He: 6). 
In contrast to this lost history is the reality of colonial settlement, where animals "provide 
the economic base for the presence of my father and myself' and the servants become the 
"hewers of wood and drawers of water and shepherds and body-servants in perpetuity" 
(HC: 19). It is in this rupture of the ties of community and reciprocity that Magda's self 
is fragmented. According to David Attwell, "The drama of this novel lies in Magda's 
attempts to find and speak a life for herself under such conditions, a life in which usual 
forms of exchange or relationship ... seem either unauthentic or simply unavailable" 
(1993:58). As Martin Buber says, in terms of the basic word-pair, the I needs a You to 
become whole. Hence, Magda's identity is contingent upon that of others. Because the 
people with whom she lives are dehumanised, her humanity is also compromised. The 
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servant becomes an implacable enemy because every aspect of one's relationship with 
him is corrupted by his debased condition of unfreedom, as Magda recognises when she 
comments that: "Slaves lose everything in their chains ... even joy in escaping from 
them" (HC: 119). There is, moreover, a disturbing, pathological interdependence that 
develops between master and servant that sustains these perverted relations: 
... the pitiful warrior in the hills was never as fonnidable as the enemy who walked in our 
shadow and said Yes baas. To the slave who would only say Yes my father could only say 
No, and I after him, and that was the start of all my woe (HC: 129). 
Magda's transgressions against her father and her attempts to construct a different 
relationship with Klein-Anna and Hendrik illustrate her desire to transcend her alienation 
from them. Early in the text, Magda articulates her need to engage in relations other than 
those served by the norn1S of patriarchy and colonialism, where she is useful "as a tool to 
bring the house to order, to regiment the servants" (HC: 41). This type of usefulness is as 
empty and arid as her desert surroundings, because "She needs to be needed. With no one 
to need her she is baffled and bewildered. Does that not explain everything?" (HC: 5). 
Later in the text she reiterates this theme: "1 am a black widow in mourning for the uses I 
was never put to" (HC: 41). What Magda wants is to restore the relation of oneness 
between the J and You that has been sundered by the ethos of domination and subjugation 
of the colonial enterprise. This yearning for fraternity and equality with others is what 
motivates her repeatedly transgressive, albeit futile, acts of violence toward her father. It 
is the absence of these relationships that marks her and that accounts in part for her rage 
and violence. As she puts it: " ... I cannot believe that fraternal intercourse would not 
have left its mark on me, the mark that has been left upon me instead is the mark of 
intercourse with the wilds, with solitude and vacancy" (HC: 47), and later: " ... perhaps 
what has been wrong all these years is simply that I have had no one to play with" 
(HC: 76). 
David Attwell (l993) also argues that the imaginary killing of her father and his new 
bride in their bed is a rebellion against what her father and his history represent to her 
(p62). In addition to the norms of patriarchy that define her existence, there are the 
constraints of colonial life that determine her relationship with others. Magda rebels 
against these social structures because, in their denial of reciprocity, they create an 
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emptiness within her that comes to define her being. Thus her lament that she is "a hole 
with a body draped around it" and "a hole crying to be whole" (HC: 41). 
According to Coetzee, however, both Jacobus (Dusklands) and Magda "lack the stature to 
transform [the] 'It' into a 'You,' to, so to speak, create a society in which reciprocity 
exists; and therefore condemn themselves to desperate gestures towards establishing 
intimacy" (quoted in Attwell, 1993: 67). According to Brody, the root of Magda's 
"obsessive monologue" lies in her estrangement from the blacks around her: "All 
attempts to break out of monologue and into real interchange with black people are 
defeated by the very language she speaks" (Moses, 1994: 169). Magda's attempts to 
befriend Klein-Anna and Hendrik and to change the nature of her relationship with them 
are doomed from the start by the pathologies of the master-servant relationship. The only 
language that Magda has recourse to in her communication with Klein-Anna and Hendrik 
is that which she knows, one based on her superiority over them, so that when Hendrik 
angers her she screams at him: "You danmed hotnot, it's all your fault ... " (HC: 91). 
The servants, however, are just as bound by their language of subservience. When 
Magda asks Klein-Anna to call her by her name, she is unable to do so: "No, miss, I 
can't" (p102). 
According to JM Coetzee, ") am not a herald of community or anything else ... I am 
someone who has intimations of freedom (as every chained prisoner has) and constructs 
representations ... of people slipping their chains and turning their faces to the light" 
(1992:341). Magda comments that: "In the heart of nowhere, in this dead place, I am 
making a start; or, if not that, making a gesture" (HC: 110). In her quest to transcend the 
objectification of the 'other' and in her constructions of a community, Magda represents 
just such a turning towards the light. She does not know how to relate to the servants in a 
more equitable way and her attempts to befriend Hendrik and Klein-Anna eventually fail, 
culminating in Hendrik raping her, thereby merely repeating the patriarchal norm of male 
dominance. However, her determination to establish a different type of relationship with 
the servants, one that is based more on equality, signals her turning towards the light. Of 
Klein-Anna she says that: "I would like to be her little sister" (HC: 87). These words fill 
her with joy, and she imagines that the feeling of happiness that comes from thinking this 
way is due to the fact that these words come from her heart. When she invites Hendrik 
and Klein-Anna into the house, at first they sleep on the floor in the kitchen, but later they 
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make up two beds in the guestroom, decently, with sheets and blankets ... " (He: 
110). Her plea throughout this novel is to be spoken to " ... in the true language of the 
heart" as "Neither master nor slave, neither parent nor child" (HC: 133). Her failure to 
achieve this communication leads her, in despair, to attempt to communicate with the 
sky-gods, a sign that she has gone mad. But even this turning away from the human 
environment around her does not indicate that she has given up on her quest. Though her 
quest for reciprocity clearly fails, her thirst for it cannot be assuaged and her descent into 
madness is perhaps the sign of the extremity of her desire, prefiguring that same intensity 
of longing in Coetzee's other, subsequent works. 
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III 
In Life and Times of Michael K the theme of salvation is developed through K's 
insistence in living on his own terms, that is, in living in freedom at a time when this right 
was severely curtailed to people like Michael K, who owned no property and had no job. 
K's determination to stay out of the camps and live according to his own desires can be 
better understood within a framework of lean-Paul Sartre's notion of human freedom. In 
The Republic of Silence, Sartre outlines why the German occupation produced a situation 
in which the French Resistance, from 1940 - 1945, registered its most acute resistance in 
the form of freedom: 
We were never more free than during the German occupation. We had lost all our rights, 
beginning with the right to talk. Every day we were insulted to our faces and had to take 
it in silence. Under one pretext or another, as workers, Jews, or political prisoners, we 
were deported en masse. Everywhere, on billboards, in the newspapers, on the screen, we 
encountered the revolting and insipid picture of ourselves that our suppressors wanted us 
to accept. And because of all this we were free. Because the Nazi venom seeped into our 
thoughts, every accurate thought was a conquest. Because an all-powerful police tried to 
force us to hold our tongues, every word took on the value of a declaration of principles. 
Because we were hunted down, everyone of our gestures had the weight of a solemn 
commitment ... (as quoted in Barret, 1958:213). 
According to William Barret, the basic premise in Sartre's view of human freedom is the 
ability to say No; this is "The essential freedom, the ultimate and final freedom that 
cannot be taken from a man ... " (1958:215). Michael K exhibits this freedom by 
consistently refusing to be contained within the camps. It is this refusal to allow himself 
to be determined by others that marks K's identity and that gives meaning to his 
existence. 
Erich Fromm's To have or to be? offers pertinent insight into understanding how the 
type of freedom evinced by K ean function as a mode of salvation. In this study, 
Fromm's central argument is that society must change its mode of existence in terms of 
the values and attitudes that govern human behaviour. Essentially, it must change from a 
focus on greed, profit, ownership and possession, i.e. from a 'having' mode of existence, 
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to one that is centred on 'being', where the focus is on relatedness to oneself and the 
world, and experiencing life in its authenticity and aliveness. Michael K resonates with 
the 'being' mode of existence in his insistence on living in freedom, on living life 
according to his own terms. When he is faced with authority and submitting to the rules 
of others he becomes a lesser person: he feels stupidity descending on him and is unable 
to communicate. However, when he is able to live in harmony with nature and the world 
around him, he is lifted to a state resembling bliss. 
In To have or to be? Erich Fromm argues that modem society's mode of existence is 
unhealthy because it creates a society that alienates people from one another and produces 
economic and ecological dangers. The 'having' mode of existence is centred on a greed 
and craving for things that conforms to the concept of 'wanting', a fundamental concept 
in Buddhist thought that results in human suffering rather than enjoyment (1976:66). One 
consequence of the having mode of existence is that it "transforms everybody and 
everything into something dead and subject to another's power" (p82); it also "makes 
things of both object and subject. The relationship is one of deadness, not aliveness" 
(p83). Fromm argues that the "condition for love and for productive being", in other 
words, to achieve full being (according to Eckhart), is to be free from the need and desire 
to crave and hold on to things (p69). 
Fromm cites a report by Mesarovic and Pestel that deals with global trends in technology, 
economics and population, which concludes that significant changes in man's way of life 
nced to be made in order to avert catastrophe on a global scale. These changes would 
have to encompass a "new ethic and a new attitude towards nature" (p 18). 
Michael K demonstrates this 'new ethic'. According to Easton, Life and Times of Michael 
K seeks a way to rewrite the "colonial script of possession", one of the defining features 
of South African life, by interrogating the colonial/apartheid mythologies of land, 
settlement, possession and ownership (1995:3). A key concern in Michael K is the 
question of whether there is a way to re-imagine this history. In a discussion of the way 
in which land is figured in colonial South Africa, Coetzee identifies two "dream 
topographies", one of which is a "network of boundaries criss-crossing the surface of the 
land, marking off thousands of farms, each a separate kingdom ... " (1988:7). This 
division of the land marks it as possessed and owned. 
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Michael K experiences a deep sense of contentment when he finds himself living off the 
land and a gradual lessening of the anxiety that he used to feel while on the road. His 
feelings of contentment are such that he feels he could live there "forever" or "till I die" 
(Coetzee, 1983:46). As K wanders through the land, he "wondered whether there were 
not forgotten corners and angles and corridors between the fences, land that belonged to 
no one yet" (LTMK: 47). As Magda in In the Heart a/the Countl)' remarks, "To the spur 
of desire we have only one response: to capture, to enclose, to hold ... " (HC: 114). 
Michael K offers a different response. His joy in the land comes from being a part of it 
and experiencing its natural bounty. Throughout the text his most intense happiness 
comes from the land: 
His deepest pleasure came at sunset when he turned open the cock at the damn wall and 
watched the stream of water run ... There were times ... when a fit of exultation would 
pass through him at the thought that he, alone and unknown, was making this deserted 
farm bloom (p59). 
Every time he released the brake and the wheel spun and the water came, it seemed to 
him a miracle (p60). 
He felt at home at the dam as he had never felt in the house ... I want to live here, he 
thought. . .It is as simple as that (p99) . 
. , .as he moved about his field he felt a deep joy in his physical being (p I 0 I). 
He breathed into his lungs the clear sweet smell of water brought up from inside the earth. 
It intoxicated him, he could not have enough of it (p 115). 
K's relationship with the land transcends the alienation of objectification that marks 
ownership and possession of it. Unlike the colonial spirit of taming and domesticating, K 
"did not explore his new world. He did not turn his cave into a home or keep a record of 
the passage of the days ... " (p68). He does not want to leave a lasting trace of his 
presence on the land, hence "Even his tools should be of wood and leather and gut, 
materials the insects would eat when one day he no longer needed them" (p I 04). It is this 
consciousness that marks K as different and that defines his resistance - from Huis 
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Norenius to Jakkalsdrifto the rehabilitation camp at Kenilworth, K refuses to be enclosed 
by the boundaries imposed on him. Notably, K is rooted nowhere. He roams the Cape 
from Sea Point to Prince Albert and back, without inscribing himself on the land. The 
history of colonisation has been a fencing off, a partitioning of the land into parcels of 
possessions. Michael K tries to find a way to live on the land that is based less on 
ownership and more on reciprocity. 
Coetzee has commented that K "can't hope to keep the garden because, finally, the whole 
surface of South Africa has been surveyed and mapped and disposed of' (Morphet, 
1984:62). K's resistance to this colonisation is a defining feature of the text ~ his 
existence on the land is based on entirely different terms to those that define the 
coloniserlsettler (Easton, 1995:7). In L!fe and Times of Michael K, there is another war 
that is going on, besides the civil war it is K's war against the 'father-bom' 
epistemologies of Westem discourse that of ownership and possession. Instead, K 
asserts another way to live in the world, one that entails being part of, not owning, the 
land. K deliberately uses materials and tools that will disintegrate when they are no 
longer needed. His mother's ashes are dispersed on the ground to become part of the soil. 
His elusiveness is a resistance to being contained by any narrative, in the same way that 
his physical being resists the containment of the various camps in which he finds himself, 
and that is his triumph: "Perhaps the truth is that it is enough to be out of the camps, out 
of all the camps at the same time" (LTMK: 182). 
In contrast to the 'having' mode of existence is the 'being' mode, in which there is an 
absence of craving for things and which entails joyousness, aliveness and a relation to the 
world that is authentic (Fromm, 1976:33). According to Fromm, the etymological root of 
being H ••• denotes the reality of existence of who or what is; it states his/her/its 
authenticity and truth. Stating that somebody or something is refers to the person's or the 
thing's essence, not to his/her/its appearance" (1976:33). Being entails a way of seeing 
the world that is stripped of falsity and illusion, and that perceives, with deepening 
insight, what is real about the self, about others and about the world in which we live. In 
order to see with such clarity we need to be wary of being deceived by what is on the 
surface. Invoking various thinkers like Marx, Freud and Eckhart, Fromm concludes that 
"knowing begins with the awareness of the deceptiveness of our common sense 
perceptions ... with the shattering of illusions ... Knowing means to penetrate through the 
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surface ... to 'see' reality in its nakedness ... and to strive critically and actively in order 
to approach truth ever more closely" (p47). Magda is unable to exist in equilibrium 
because she sees the reality and truth of the ugliness of her and her father's way of life; 
hence she is perpetually engaged in creating different realities for herself. The fact that 
she needs to do so at all is simply an indication of how difficult it is for her to accept 
living in such alienation from others. 
In providing a definition of what it means 'to be', Fromm invokes the ideas of the mystics 
- to make oneself 'empty' and 'poor' (p93). When K escapes from the Visagie grandson 
into the mountains, he feels all desire and craving for wanting leaving him: "Now, in 
front of his cave, he ... emptied his mind, wanting nothing, looking forward to nothing" 
(LTMK: 69). For Marx, (as quoted in Fromm) "The less you are and the less you express 
your life the more you have and the greater is your alienated life ... Everything the 
economist takes away from you in the way of life and humanity, he restores to you in the 
form of money and wealth" (Fromm, 1976: 155). For Schweitzer, solidarity with others in 
the act of giving and caring for them is the only mcaningful way of life (Fromm, 
1976: 160). On his way to Prince Albert, Michael K meets a stranger who offers him a 
place to sleep for the night and a meal. When K tells him that he'd met another man who 
told him that they shot people they found on their land, the stranger tells him that his own 
belief is that people must help each other. This kindness reveals what Martin Buber in I 
and Thou calls love, which becomes a "responsibility of an I for a You" (Buber, 
1970:66). It induces a change in the normally reticent Michael at the breakfast table the 
following morning: "At the table the urge again came over him to speak ... His heart was 
full, he wanted to utter his thanks ... " (LTMK: 48). Similarly, when a stranger in the 
hospital yard gives him money to buy them both a pie, the pie is "so delicious that tears 
came to his eyes" and K "listened to the birds in the trees and tried to remember when he 
had known such happiness" (p30). Both instances of kindness produce in K a feeling 
akin to rapture, because both acts of kindness are spontaneous and without expectation of 
anything in return. In contrast to this is his relationship with the Visagie grandson, whose 
introduction to him immediately sets up a relation of subjugation when he introduces 
himself as "boss Visagie's grandson" (p60). This kind of relation induces in him a 
feeling of "the old hopeless stupidity" (p60). When K brings the grandson some birds to 
eat that he had shot with his catapult, the grandson asks whether he can clean them 
quickly this K immediately resists, with the result that the Visagie grandson becomes 
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rude and aggressive and threatening towards him (pp63-4). Once again, K begins to feel 
"stupidity creep over him like a fog" and that he "no longer knew what to do with his 
face" (p64). When the grandson orders him to go to Prince Albert with a list of things to 
buy, K buries the money at the gate of the farm and leaves, refusing to be turned into 
someone else's "body-servant" (p65). 
When K is faced with attempts to contain or control and order him, he becomes deadened. 
The joy, however, that he experiences in the face of, for example, others' kindness and 
the bounty of the land, reveals a way of being-in-the-world that defines not only an 
alternative politics, but also contains within it something apolitical, a kind of spirituality, 
a form of love which is felt to be redemptive. 
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IV 
In Disgrace, Coetzee explores the themes of redemption and salvation within the context 
of a country coming to terms with its past and transformed present David Lurie, the 
main protagonist, embodies the way in which private and public worlds intersect in this 
story of post-apartheid South AfTica. 
In a lecture to his class in his course on the Romantic poets, David Lurie discusses a 
section from Book 6 of Wordsworth's The Preludes. In the poem, the poet, on 
summitting Mont Blanc, "grieved/To have a soulless image on the eye/That had usurped 
upon a living thought" (Coetzee, 1999:21). Lurie explains to his class that the reason the 
poet grieves upon seeing the peak unveiled is that there is a disjunction between the 
reality and the imagination; the reality is often much more mundane and mediocre in 
comparison to the imagination. The poet's use of the phrase "soulless image" indicates 
the extent to which the reality fails to compare with the imagination. While the reality is 
tied to the corporeal moment, the imagination is able to elevate us beyond mere physical 
existence into a realm infinitely higher. Lurie goes on to suggest to his class that the 
resolution or challenge is not in "keep[ing] the imagination pure, protected from the 
onslaughts of reality"; rather, that" ... the question has to be, Can we find a way for the 
two to coexist?" (Disgrace, p22). 
To be fully human means more than just to exist in a state of nature. If we are ever to 
experience one of those "revelatory, Wordsworthian moments", we must in some way be 
in touch with the imagination, the idea, with what enables us to experience the divine in 
ourselves. 
The challenge that is posed in Disgrace is how to find a space in which the idea and the 
reality can coexist; in other words, how we can live fully as human beings in a particular 
reality. 
The South Africa in which David Lurie finds himself at the beginning of the novel is an 
altered world from the one in which he has grown up. His position as a white, liberal, 
English-speaking academic has become one that is embattled in the new landscape. The 
rationalisation of education has resulted in the transformation of Cape Town University 
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College into the Cape Technical University. His position, that of professor of modern 
languages, has changed to that of adjunct professor of communications. He is allowed to 
offer a course in the Romantic poets because it is seen as being beneficial to the staff in 
terms of morale to offer a course of their choice. Anthony Holliday, commenting on this 
trend in education, calls it "the philistinism of what has become a global degradation of 
higher learning" (Holliday, 2003). Lurie's position as Communications lecturer is one 
that, with his intellectual background, he finds difficult to accommodate. The pragmatic, 
instrumentalist premise of his new subject foregrounds language as functionary, language 
as a means of communicating "our thoughts, feelings and intentions to each other" 
(Coetzee, 1999:4). This idea of language he finds "preposterous". When read against his 
discussion of the Wordsworth poem, The Preludes, this notion of language will rob us 
forever of the possibility of a way of thinking that will lift us beyond the everyday, the 
mundane. 
Derek Attridge situates this rationalisation of education within a paradigm of global 
capitalism, and views events in Disgrace as a critique of its dehumanising effects 
(Attridge, 2000:3) and as reflecting an "immense distaste" for "a new global age of 
performance indicators and outcomes measurement, of benchmarking and quality 
assurance ... " (Attridge, 2000:5). Lurie's contribution to this new age is negligible. His 
students are indifferent because he is unable to engage with the material he teaches, 
material for which "he has no respect" (Coetzee, 1999:4). He is alienated, removed from 
engagement with both his students and his subject. 
On the legacy of JM Coetzee's fiction in South Africa, Anthony Holliday, in an article in 
This Day, argues that apartheid and colonialism have underpinned Coetzee's fiction, that 
they are "the heart of the matter". They were "virulent life forms that affected our ways 
of seeing the world and one another, our sense of what it is to live decently and our 
capacity to love anything" (Holliday, 2003). Disgrace registers just such a world, one in 
which to "live decently" has become increasingly difficult. 
Published in 1999, Disgrace is set in contemporary, post-apartheid South Africa. Jane 
Poyner argues that Disgrace can be read as an allegory of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, in which David Lurie's sense of guilt over his exploitative attitude towards 
women symbolises collective responsibility for a history of white abuse (2002:67). 
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Essentially, the context is one in which the aftermath of apartheid has to be confronted 
and lived through. This context evokes a number of issues, such as reconciliation, justice, 
forgiveness, truth, transformation and reparation. This is a space where the past has to be 
accounted for. On South Africa's history, Coetzee has commented in Doubling the Point 
that ''The whites of South Africa participated, in various degrees, actively or passively, in 
an audacious and well-planned crime against South Africa ... It will be a long time before 
they have the moral authority to withdraw that brandmark" (Coetzee, 1992:342-3). 
One response to the complex and difficult issues facing post-apartheid South Africa was 
the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a committee set up 
to focus on uncovering apartheid crimes and providing a forum for social healing between 
the perpetrators and the victims of apartheid, or, in broader terms, working towards 
reconciliation between blacks and whites. Amnesty was granted to the perpetrators of 
apartheid crimes in return for giving 'full disclosure' about politically motivated crimes. 
This truth was meant to lay the basis for reconciliation the banner at every TRC hearing 
proclaiming that Truth is the "Road to Reconciliation" (Graham, 2003:11). However, as 
Boehmer (2002) points out, the TRC presented dilemmas of its own, in that it " ... valued 
the display of truth-telling over justice" (p344), " ... elevated the principle of forgiveness 
over that of justice" and" ... rated public confession more highly than equitable material 
settlement" (p345). In addition to this, Graham points out that the very notion of truth 
became a contested one when contradictory accounts between perpetrators and victims 
emerged, and that: 
... when the commissioners decide that an applicant has made full disclosure and is 
therefore eligible for amnesty, they accept the perpetrator's version of events, even when 
it directly contradicts the evidence given by his victims ((2003: 12). 
This aspect of the TRC process thus highlighted one of the paradoxes of the committee, in 
that it led to conflict rather than reconciliation, pitting as it did conflicting versions of the 
truth between perpetrator and victim. How to make adequate reparation for the crimes of 
the past was and remains one of the key questions of post-apartheid discourse, with the 
question of justice finding an ironic echo in David Lurie's plea, in the wake of Lucy's 
rape, that: "I want those men to be caught and brought before the law and punished. Am I 
wrong? Am I wrong to want justice?" (Coetzee, 1999: 119). Horrell argues that Disgrace 
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suggests that the rhetoric of confession and repentance for past crimes in South Africa is 
wholly inadequate: H ••• the spoken language of repentance, the 'sorry' exacted from men 
of torture and oppression, is desperately insufficient and largely unheard" (2000:31). 
The end of institutionalised apartheid and the transition to a democratic social order have 
wrought significant changes in the social landscape, in relations between communities 
that had hitherto been characterised by dominance and subjugation between the races. In 
an effort to facilitate reconciliation and nation-building, Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
popularised and made powerful the discourse of the 'rainbow nation'. One of the 
(unintended) results of this discourse, however, has been a veiling of the immense chasm 
between blacks and whites. Disgrace registers this politically expedient strategy in the 
play that Melanie Isaacs acts in, where "Catharsis seems to be the presiding principle: all 
the coarse old prejudices brought into the light of day and washed away in gales of 
laughter" (Disgrace :23). Lurie's attitude suggests that this depiction of relations 
between black and white in the new South Africa is indicative of a desire to deal with the 
atrocities of the past in a way that avoids and obscures the depths of complexities that 
underpin the relationship between communities that had formerly been divided by an 
ideology that posited one race as inherently superior to another. The narrative of 
Disgrace critiques this facile scenario, registering a view of relations between blacks and 
whites that is uneasy, disturbing, constantly shifting, with relations of power inexorably 
and radically altering. 
Magda (In the Heart of the CountfY) comments that she could have written a different 
story, but did not, because she thought "it was too easy" (HC: 139). This seems to me a 
core concern in Disgrace - that a genuine transformation of society needs a more 
assiduous engagement with the deeper structures that comprises it. Coetzee has argued 
that the liberal impulse towards fraternity with blacks has been "a yearning to have 
fraternity without paying for it" (Coetzee, 1992:97). Disgrace asks us to consider the 
conditions or terms under which it is possible to live with a history such as ours; or, as 
TS Eliot puts it: "After such knowledge, what forgiveness?" Coetzee's response, as 
articulated in Disgrace, suggests that there is, ultimately, no escape from history. 
However, it can also be argued that the religious impulse in his work is just such an 
attempt, at least in part. 
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The idea behind the 'rainbow nation' discourse and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, that blacks will be forgiving and accommodating, is violently disrupted by 
the attack by three black men on Lurie and his daughter, Lucy. Against the discourse of 
reconciliation, Coetzee posits a discourse of violence and confrontation, one that 
questions the assumptions of forgiveness without justice, of getting on with the present, 
of moving forward. Hannan Hever (2002) argues that the narrative of Disgrace posits the 
recognition that, collectively, the lives of both blacks and whites in post-apartheid South 
Africa are saturated with past violence, and that the South African liberal" ... must face 
up to forces far more potent than any discrete effort to repair a long historical legacy of 
injustice and suffering" (p42). 
Lucy's smallholding at first holds the promise of the peace and harmony normally 
associated with the pastoral, in opposition to the harshness of the city; a refuge where 
Lurie can go to recover and recollect himself. According to Cornwell, Lucy's 
smallholding represents a way in which to imagine relating to the land in South Africa 
that is different to both the colonial farm in In the Heart of the Country and the camps of 
L(ie and Times of Michael K. in other words, a way of relating to the land that is free of 
domination and dispossession (2003:48). Lucy's response to the history of greed and 
exploitation is to establish a modest, subsistence-based enterprise. Here too, however, 
Lurie finds that he is out of place. The attack on Lucy brings home to him forcefully that 
he is in a situation that has scant regard for the ideals that he holds so dear. The relations 
of power between blacks and whites have shifted. Despite the suspicions he harbours 
about Petrus's involvement in Lucy's rape, he is unable to do anything about it: "In the 
old days one could have had it out with Petrus. In the old days one could have had it out 
to the extent of losing one's temper and sending him packing and hiring someone in his 
place" (Disgrace: 116). Relations that had previously been characterised by dependence 
and subjugation now have to be negotiated with caution and deference. 
Here, on the Eastern Cape border, present relations between black and white are saturated 
with the weight of the past. The fact that in Disgrace, a white woman is raped by black 
men further complicates the way in which we think about the intertwining of race and 
gender; or, as Farred puts it: "How does the white woman's violations measure up 
against the black man's historic disenfranchisements?" (Farred, 2000: 19). Boehmer 
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(2002) argues that one of the debates that Coetzee sets up in Disgrace is that of finding a 
way to adequately respond to " ... an experience of disgrace and bodily violation for 
perpetrator as well as for victim" (p344). JM Coetzee, in his Jerusalem Prize 'Acceptance 
Speech' (of 1987), locates the unfreedom of white South Africans as a "failure of love". 
The consequence of this failure has been the "shock" of discovering that "fraternity by 
itself is not to be had ... Fraternity ineluctably comes in a package with liberty and 
equality". 
Lucy wonders whether the desire for vengeance and reparation of past sins is not in fact 
the deeper reason for the attack on her: "What if ... what if that is the price one has to 
pay for staying on? ... They see me as owing something. . .. Why should I be allowed to 
live here without paying?" (Disgrace: 158). That the brutal attack on Lucy takes place in 
a town in the Eastern Cape is historically significant in terms of racial conflict in South 
Africa. In a review essay of Noel Mostert's Frontiers, a history of conflict between 
British missionaries and Xhosas on the Cape Colony'S eastern border, Coetzee explains 
why the Eastern Cape plays such a notable role in South Africa's history. After the 
Napoleonic Wars, in the wake of British unemployment, 4000 volunteers left for Africa 
as they were offered free land on the Eastern Cape frontier. Grahamstown became the 
fountainhead of British culture in South Africa, providing a link between white, English-
speaking South Africans and the liberal traditions of Britain. Mostert argues, however, 
that this link was always tenuous at best: "There was a quality of racial hatred in 
[Grahamstown] of a virulence that equalled, and probably surpassed, anything previously 
experienced in South Africa" (Coetzee, 2002:337). The reason that he advances for this 
is that, unlike the frontier Boers who had, to some extent, integrated with the Xhosas, the 
British settlers held on tightly to their culture and traditions, so that when their homes 
were sacked in frontier wars and their possessions, which constituted their social capital, 
was lost, it " ... was felt as a crippling assault upon their social identity, as it was not by 
the Boers. Hence their rage; hence, ultimately, the hostility between white and black that 
characterises the Eastern Cape down to the present day" (2002:337). The frontier wars 
that followed were described by Mostert as "... the most tragically disastrous and 
tarnished involvement between Britain and a sovereign black people in Africa in the 
nineteenth century" (pp337-8), with the start, in 1850, of what turned out to be worst of 
those wars, what Mostert calls "a war of race, perhaps the first of its kind" (p338). Gareth 
Corwell argues that the location of Salem in the Eastern Cape evokes a history of strife 
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over land and Lucy's response to her violation can be seen" ... as a radical intervention in 
the cycle of retributive violence which had ... defined human relations on the frontier" 
(2003:46). 
Situating his discussion of Disgrace within the framework of contemporary border 
theory, Grant Farred views the choice of the Eastern Cape as the site of the brutal, violent 
events in Disgrace as one that evokes the "historical frontier" of some of the most violent 
clashes between black and white, from the "infamous wars among the white colonists, the 
Afrikaner Trekkers and the indigenous black population" to the "struggles against 
colonial incursion, struggles over livestoek, over boundaries, over control of the land" 
(Farred, 2000: 17). It is bere, be suggests, that "the burden of race weighs most heavily", 
where the "complications of the past demand the most assiduous engagement" (Farred, 
2000:17). 
In speaking of the rape, Lucy is deeply disturbed by the fact that "It was done with such 
personal hatred" (Disgrace: 156). As Lucy's rapists were strangers to her, they had no 
particular reason to feel any personal antagonism towards her. The fact, however, that 
they demonstrated such personal hatred can be explained by invoking the eontext of the 
attack on her. Pum1a Gobodo-Madikizela, an associate professor of psychology at UCT 
and author of A human being died that night: a story of forgiveness, explains one theory 
regarding the evolution of violence and personal evil: 
... certain individuals are predisposed toward becoming evil as a result of early childhood 
experiences of violenee that made them suffer shame and humiliation, leaving them with 
unresolved anger. According to this view, the dynamics of evil that evolve from 
childhood psychological history often explain the roots of revenge, where anger and 
hatred resulting from the trauma suffered in the past are carried inside until the feelings of 
aggression can be enacted toward another in what becomes the individual's moment to 
reclaim the "honor" lost during the shaming experience (2003:55). 
As Farred suggests earlier, the "complications ofthe past" will not simply disappear. The 
violence of apartheid produces its own pathologies, which can be manifested in a variety 
of ways. Gobodo-Madikizela's explanation of the effects of psychic trauma is one way of 
understanding the persona) motivation behind the rapists' attack. Mike Marais offers 
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another explanation that also takes into account the way in which history plays a role in 
creating a climate of violence and fear. According to him, violence against others can be 
located in an inability to identify with others, and this inability is a result of relations 
between individuals in society that are characterised by alienation from one another 
(Marais, 2000:57). Disgrace explores this alienation of self from other and the resultant 
relations that ensue from this inability to identify with the other in its depiction of events 
in post-apartheid South Africa. This particular context provides the background against 
which the violence of colonialism and apartheid is seen as co-extensive with the violence 
currently being experienced. It posits a vision of a nation that has been deformed by its 
history of abnegation of the other and explores the ways in which this history informs the 
substance of the present. It also stages a consideration of the ways in which relations of 
reciprocity and exclusion of violence between the sel f and other can be imagined. 
Disgrace shows that the rhetoric of 'unity in diversity' and reconciliation has been an 
inadequate response to the past. In the face of an inability to meet rising expectations in 
the new dispensation, where the promises of 'a better life for all' have been agonisingly 
slow, Disgrace registers a society struggling to come to grips with its ideological 
ambivalences and historical aporias. Lurie's response to Lucy's rape is, arguably, only 
moral and decent ~ he wants justice: the crime must be punished; he wants Lucy to leave 
the Eastern Cape, perhaps go to Holland, so that she will be safe. 
From Lurie's perspective, Lucy's response of silence is baffling. All she will say is that 
the soeio-historical context makes silence the only response possible for her: "In another 
time, in another place it might be held to be a public matter. But in this place, at this 
time, it is not" (Disgrace: 112). 
Here, on the Eastern Cape border, notions of reconciliation and 'unity in diversity' have 
limited currency. Violence and menace are the presiding principles. In the attack on 
Lucy's small-holding, Lurie is beaten and burnt; his car is stolen; the dogs are shot and 
Lucy is gang-raped. Here, the disgrace of the post-apartheid nation is articulated: a 
society where violence is an indelible part of the nation's psyche. Disgrace attempts to 
understand this violence by situating it within its socio-historical context. 
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Lucy's rape can be read within the context of a history that has made all whites complicit 
in black dispossession and subjugation, and the need to make those responsible pay for 
the sins of the past, in a context where legal restitution is largely circumscribed. Lucy's 
reference to her rapists as "debt collectors" (Disgrace: 158) reinforces the notion that 
payment for the past will be exacted. This disheartening cycle of retributive violence is 
disrupted, however, by Lucy's response to the rape and the change that comes over David 
Lurie during the course of the novel. 
Insofar as Disgrace is a novel that deals with the socio-historical reality of South Africa's 
past and present, it can also be read as a text about salvation and redemption. In this text, 
David Lurie, the main protagonist, inhabits a space that can be defined as one of spiritual 
or psychic numbness. At the outset of the text we sense this emptiness when he describes 
his weekly sessions with Soraya, a prostitute whom he has been visiting for the past year, 
as an "oasis" in "the desert of the week" (D: 1). While he has neatly solved one part of his 
life, the "problem of sex", other aspects are clearly problematic. His need for something 
more than just sex, a relationship with Soraya that transcends the boundaries of mere 
client and customer, results in him losing her entirely, so that he once again has to deal 
with the 'problem of sex'. The resolution of this problem culminates in him having to 
leave the university in disgrace. However, before this happens, we also discover other 
aspects of his life that contribute to the sense of lack of fulfilment in his life, despite the 
fact that he describes himself as being, "by most measurements", happy (D: 2). He is a 
scholar, but one who is "tired of criticism, tired of prose measured by the yard" (D: 4). 
At the university where he teaches, he finds himself "more out of place than ever" (D: 4) 
as a result of the rationalization at the university, where his training in modem languages 
is rendered superfluous in the face of current, more practical needs, so that he finds 
himself teaching in the field of Communication skills, a field for which he has little 
respect. His reference to himself and other colleagues like him as "clerks in a post-
religious age" as well as the fact that "He has never been much of a teacher" (D: 4) 
reflects a sense of weariness and disenchantment with himself and the situation of his life. 
Moreover, in the new educational arena, he finds that his knowledge and learning are 
irrelevant. Commenting to his daughter of the impact he had on his students, Lurie says 
that "What I had to say they didn't care to hear" CD: 63). 
31 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Lurie inhabits a world from which he has become alienated, out of place: "His mind has 
become a refuge for old thoughts, idle, indigent, with nowhere else to go. He ought to 
chase them out, sweep the premises clean. But he does not care to do so, or does not care 
enough." (Disgrace: 72). When Lucy questions him about the sexual harassment case, 
his response underlines his sense of being out of place: "The case you want me to make 
is a case that can no longer be made, basta. Not in our day". Lurie's seduction of 
Melanie [saacs is enabled by a Romantic tradition that privileges a discourse of ideas and 
beauty. Thus, Lurie is able to say that he was a servant of Eros (Greek god of love) when 
he acted upon his desire for Melanie. When he is called to account for his behaviour, he 
refuses to do so in the terms of penitence required, suggesting that he does not genuinely 
regret the incident - after all, he feels that he has been "enriched" by the experience. 
However, his invocation of Eros as defence, what Attwell refers to as his "aestheticisation 
of desire" (Attwell, 200 I :865), belongs, as Lurie acknowledges, to another universe of 
discourse. Where Lurie would like to view his seduction of Melanie as an essentially 
private matter, he is part of a new order that no longer allows it, one that, on the contrary, 
is insistent upon his accountability. While Lurie is prepared to accept the punishment for 
his actions, he is not prepared to denounce them, refusing their insistence upon his 
accountability. His disgrace is thus two-fold: not only is he forced to leave the university 
in disgrace, his Romantic sensibilities render him both out of touch and out of place in 
this new age. 
For much of his life, David Lurie has been accustomed to easy sexual gratification, based 
on his physical attractiveness - "his height, his good bones, his olive skin, his flowing 
hair" (Disgrace: 7» and from having spent his childhood predominantly in the company 
of women. He calls this aspect of his life "the backbone of his life" (D: 7). When, 
suddenly, this ease with women ended: 
He existed in an anxious flurry of promiscuity. He had affairs with the wIves of 
colleagues; he picked up tourists in bars on the waterfront or at the Club ltalia; he slept 
with whores (D: 7). 
Finding Soraya solved this problem of sexual gratification perfectly - his relationship 
with her became "just what he wanted ... In a year he has not needed to go back to the 
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agency" (D: 7). When he is no longer able to see her, the week becomes "as featureless 
as a desert" (D: 11). 
Feelings of emptiness and the wretchedness of existence abound in Disgrace. From the 
beginning of the text, Lurie's very existence seems mired in meaninglessness and 
emptiness. His professional life is uninspiring and dull, marked by indifference and lack 
of interest. His personal life is empty of meaningful connections with others or any other 
type of fulfilment. Despite leading a comfortable, middle-class life, he is, to a marked 
extent, empty of meaning in a deeper sense. One way in which to understand his 
emptiness is to view it as an existential question that requires some kind of answer. 
In William Barret's Irrational Man: A study in existentialist philosophy, he argues that 
existentialist philosophy arose in part as a result of the failure of Enlightenment reason to 
provide man with fulfilment and meaning in life; that, on the contrary, 
... man's feeling of homelessness, of alienation has been intensified in the midst of a 
bureaucratised, impersonal mass society. He has come to feel himself an outsider even 
within his own human society (1958: 31). 
For Carl Jaspers, existentialist philosophy arose: 
... as a struggle to awaken in the individual the possibilities of an authentic and genuine 
life, in the face of the great modem drift toward a standardised mass society (1958: 28). 
According to Pascal (as quoted in Barrett), the human condition, when examined closely, 
is one that is, by nature, 'feeble' and 'wretched'. This state is "our ordinary morial 
existence itself'. There are two ways in which we can escape from thinking about this 
too deeply - through habit and diversion, which hide from man" ... his nothingness, his 
forlornness, his inadequacy, his impotence and his emptiness" (1958: 99). According to 
Pascal, the only remedy for this is religion. No amount oflogic or reason will enable man 
to come to terms with his situation. 
David Lurie displays a similar sense of despair in his life. He says of himself that "I am 
sunk into a state of disgrace from which it will not be easy to lift myself' (Disgrace: 
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172). His seduction of Melanie Isaacs has alienated him and made him a figure of disgust 
and outrage to others. The shift in educational philosophy and practice has made him feel 
estranged and superfluous, so that he has nothing genuine and meaningful to offer the 
students. Coetzee, in depicting the psychic wretchedness of David Lurie's existence, is 
foregrounding, at least at first, the impossibility of salvation or redemption, in such a 
world, at any rate. The sexual harassment case against Lurie is part of this seemingly 
unredeemable world. When his meetings with Soraya end, he meets Melanie Isaacs, a 
student with whom he starts an affair, somewhat coercive in nature. When he is charged 
with sexual harassment, he is faced with the disapproval and disgust that an old man's 
desire for a young woman evokes, what he refers to as "inappropriate desires" (D: 43). In 
his ex-wife, Rosalind's, summary: "The whole thing is disgraceful from beginning to 
end" (D: 45). What makes the case for himself particularly unsympathetic, in Lurie's 
opinion, is the fact that the idea of sexual needs and desires in the old is essentially rather 
unattractive: "After a certain age one is simply no longer appealing, and that's that. One 
just has to buckle down and live out the rest of one's life. Serve one's time" (D: 67). 
At the committee hearing before which he appears, hc is censured for rcfusing to cxplain 
his side of the story, despite pleading guilty to all the charges brought against him. One 
of the women on the committee, a young woman from the Business School, asks him 
whether he has sought counselling from a priest or a counsellor, and whether he is in fact 
prepared to undergo counselling. Another woman on the committee, Dr Farodia Rassool, 
expresses her dissatisfaction with his refusal to explain his side of the story, accusing him 
of being insincere in his acceptance of the charges against him. He counters by arguing 
that what they want from him is to know what is truly in his heart, and this he is not 
prepared to do in front of a secular audience: 
Frankly, what you want from me is not a response but a confession. Well, I make no 
confession. I put forward a plea, as is my right. Guilty as charged. That is my plea. 
That is as far as I am prepared to go (D: 51). 
Forced to make a confession, Lurie invokes Eros as his exeuse, saying only that in 
starting the affair "J became a servant of Eros" (D: 52). This proves unsatisfactory, and 
to save his job he is requested to make a public admission, in the form of a statement, that 
he was wrong. Here, however, Farodia Rassool intervenes to insist that the statement on 
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its own will not suffice, as they will need to determine whether "... it comes from his 
heart", what attitude it expresses, and whether it expresses contrition and reflects his 
sincere feelings (D: 54). Lurie's response expresses his scepticism: "And you trust 
yourself to divine that, from the words I use to divine whether it comes from my heart?" 
(D: 54). They want a confession from him that will demonstrate his sincerity, and to this 
Lurie refuses, saying that 'That is beyond the scope of the law" (D: 55). 
Essentially, Lurie refuses to express repentance in the form required by the committee on 
the grounds that the realm of such a confession does not belong to a secular forum. The 
tone of righteousness, particularly as adopted by the women on the committee, provoke in 
him a defiance because he senses in it something more than merely the official and legal: 
"They wanted a spectacle: breast-beating, remorse, tears if possible. A TV show, in fact" 
(D: 66). 
In an essay on autobiography and confession, Coetzee argues that there are always limits 
to how far one can divine one's own motives in confession, in that the revelation of one 
motive inevitably leads to the questioning of whether that is the real and true motive, or 
whether there lurks yet another, deeper and truer motive. One's ability to reach the truth 
of confession is therefore always stymied by the idea that the self invariably creates 
fictions in order to satisfy some need, and that the ability to be truthful is therefore 
compromised. In confession, the central question is "The problem of how to know the 
truth about the self without being self-deceived" (Coetzee, 1992:252). The end of 
confession requires something beyond perpetual scepticism and self-doubt about one's 
ability to tell the truth about oneself. Hence, Coetzee argues that the ability of Tolstoy 
and Dostoevsky to reveal deeper truths about the self is superior to that of a purely secular 
thinker, like Freud (DP: 244). Dostoevsky, in particular, provides an account of 
confession that demonstrates that what is needed is something more than one is capable of 
providing: 
Against the endlessness of scepticism Dostoevsky poses the closure not of confession but 
of absolution and therefore of the intervention of grace in the world. (DP: 249) 
According to Coetzee, Dostoevsky poses the problem in The Possessed of whether 
secular confession can ever lead to absolution, which is the goal of confession (DP: 253). 
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The confession of the Underground man demonstrates the self's inability to control its 
desire to construct its own truth (DP: 279). Dostoevsky shows therefore the impossibility 
of the self to reveal the truth: 
Because of the nature of consciousness, Dostoevsky indicates, the self cannot tell the truth 
of itself to itself and come to rest without the possibility of self-deception. True 
confession does not come from the sterile monologue of the self or from the dialogue of 
the self with its own self-doubt, but ... from faith and grace. (DP: 291) 
Getting to the heart of truthfulness thus requires something beyond oneself. In Tolstoy's 
A Confession, truthfulness is related to a reaching out towards God, being attentive and 
responsive to an inner impulse toward God (DP: 261). 
Coetzee's essay on autobiography and confession relates to Disgrace in that it accounts in 
part for David Lurie's refusal to accede to the committee's request that he bare his soul so 
that they can discern the degree of truth and sincerity in it. In Lurie's opinion, these are 
matters beyond the scope of the committee. The committee's requirements are 
fundamentally flawed in that what they require is his confession so that they can decide 
whether or not he is deserving of forgiveness. As a secular body, these are terms that 
they are not empowered to use, as it is not within their jurisdiction to dispense with 
forgiveness. 
In a famous sermon entitled 'To whom much is forgiven', the theologian Paul Tillich 
shows how forgiveness creates love. Quoting the parable about a woman who is 
considered to be a great sinner and who comes to see Jesus and is forgiven by him, Tillich 
argues that forgiveness creates love in that the woman whom Jesus forgives has a "greater 
love than the righteous ones because more is forgiven [her]" (Tillich, 1963: 7). When the 
woman comes to see Jesus, he is having supper with Simon, one of the Pharisees, a 
righteous man who is shocked by Jesus' attitude. Jesus, however, responds by telling him 
that the person who is forgiven more is loved more. Tillich explains the meaning of this 
parable on forgiveness: 
And nothing greater can happen to a human being than that he is forgiven. For 
forgiveness means reconciliation in spite of estrangement; it means reunion in spite of 
36 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
hostility; it means acceptance of those who are unacceptable, and it means reception of 
those who are rejected. (1963: 7) 
According to Tillich, forgiveness is not something that can be bargained for by penance 
and good deeds, or by our own sense of remorse. God's forgiveness is independent of 
anything that we do. It is being forgiven that creates repentance (p8). Tillich goes on to 
state, however, that while there is no condition we can set for forgiveness, we must in 
some way have been seeking it. Forgiveness is the answer and "An answer is answer 
only for him who has asked, who is aware of the question" (pS). This awareness of the 
need for forgiveness thus creates the condition necessary for forgiveness to take place. 
Righteousness rather than forgiveness is what the committee is able to dispense. Their 
demand that he explain himself and his motives and publicly confess to wrongdoing has 
overtones of a religious confession, in which penance will need to be done in order for 
absolution to be achieved. This Lurie resists. While he is prepared to accept the 
consequences of his actions, he is not prepared to express an insincere regret about it. 
The Rector is prepared to accept a statement from him in mitigation as long as it is in the 
spirit of "repentance" (D: 58). Lurie objects to this on the grounds that it is not within the 
realm of the law to decide on notions of repentance: "Repentance belongs to another 
world, to another universe of discourse" (D: 58). 
According to Lurie, his crime is essentially one of "inappropriate desires". When he gets 
to Lucy's smallholding and is taking a stroll, he is suddenly reminded of Melanie and 
experiences a strong feeling of desire for her, an indication that he, in a sense, cannot help 
himself. When trying to explain to Lucy about the case, he is reminded of a dog that used 
to live next door to them when Lucy was still young, and that used to get beaten regularly 
by its owners for becoming excited and unmanageable whenever there was a bitch in the 
vicinity. As a result, the dog learned to control its desires, but in a way that made it 
behave in a piteous manner, so that "it would chase around the garden with its ears flat 
and its tail between its legs, whining, trying to hide" (D: 90). What Lurie finds 
distressing is the spectacle of the dog learning to hate its own instincts so that it no longer 
needed to be beaten in order to restrain itself In his opinion, "At that point it would have 
been better to shoot it" (D: 90). The pathos of this case is that the dog was being 
punished for a quality inherent in its nature, and that in order to avoid being punished, it 
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would have to deny its nature. Lurie suggests that there is something similar in his own 
ease, that he is being punished for having desires that are deemed inappropriate, and that 
in this there is an element of pathos as well. 
The rights of his desire, however, are sharply contrasted with the effect it has on Melanie, 
for whom the experience is described as: "Not rape, not quite that, but undesired 
nevertheless, undesired to the core. As though she had deeided to go slack, die within 
herself for the duration ... " (D: 25), and whose" ... arms flop like the arms of a dead 
person" (D: 89). The life-giving energy of desire on Lurie's part becomes inverted in the 
effect it has on Melanie, in that it becomes associated with death there is an especial 
emphasis on this aspect of Lurie's desire in the effect it has on Melanie. So depicted here 
are the two sides of the coin of desire and the pitiful irony of the situation. 
When Lurie leaves the university, it is in a state of disgrace, aptly captured by the student 
newspaper, which prints a picture of him in a particularly ridiculous pose (his eyes are 
cast up to the sky and he is groping towards the camera with one hand, while a waste 
basket in inverted and held over his head), with the caption: "Who's the Dunce Now?" 
(D: 56). 
If Lurie leaves Cape Town in a state of disgrace, he comes to find that there are barely 
any limits to the depths of disgrace that can be experienced, and that misery and suffering 
can be compounded in infinite ways. Instead of finding the tranquillity and peace of a 
rural retreat, Lurie comes face to face with his own impotence and the horrors of a world 
in which violence and brutality create an existence of wretchedness and shame. In the 
Eastern Cape, Lurie encounters a nightmare world that leaves him feeling deadened and 
defeated. His shame at being unable to protect Lucy from being raped and his subsequent 
alienation from her only adds to the horror of the attack. He is haunted by being unable 
to save Lucy, and experiences a vision the night after the attack in which Lucy beseeches 
him to save her. Trying to get back to sleep after checking on Lucy, he is still unable to 
get the vision out of his mind: 
Nevertheless, the figure of the woman in the field of light stays before him. 'Save me!' 
cries his daughter, her words clear, ringing, immediate. Is it possible that Lucy's soul did 
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indeed leave her body and come to him? May people who do not believe in souls yet 
have them, and may their souls lead an independent life? (Disgrace: 104) 
As for the effect of the attack on himself, Lurie is left with despair and defeat: " ... he 
feels his interest in the world draining from him drop by drop" (D: 107). He likens his 
feelings to that of an old man, "tired to the bone, without hopes, without desires, 
indifferent to the future", one whose "pleasure in living has been snuffed out" (D: 107). 
That Lucy decides not to tell the police about her rape simply serves to increase his pain: 
"Lucy's secret; his disgrace" (D: 109). 
His sense of being out of place is reinforced by the encounter with the three men who 
attack him and Lucy. As a white South African academic, his European history and 
heritage make him wholly unprepared for the encounter: 
He speaks Italian, he speaks French, but Italian and French will not save him here in 
darkest Africa. He is helpless, an Aunt Sally, a figure from a cartoon, a missionary in 
cassock and topi waiting with clasped hands and upcast eyes while the savages jaw away 
in their own lingo preparatory to plunging him into their boiling cauldron. (D: 95) 
Thus, in addition to the horror of the attack is the sense Lurie has of also being an entirely 
ridiculous figure, one who is left bewildered and uncomprehending by a situation for 
which he is unprepared. 
Lurie is baffled by Lucy's determined silence over the rape. The only reason that she will 
give is that what happened to her is a purely private matter, happening as it did within a 
particular historical context that of post-apartheid South Africa. Lurie's attempts to 
ascribe certain motives to her silence, such as that shc feels constrained to act given the 
historically complicit position of white South Africans, is dealt with shortly: "You keep 
misreading me. Guilt and salvation are abstractions. I don't act in terms of abstractions. 
Until you make an effort to see that, I can't help you" (D: 112). 
When Lurie and Lucy encounter one of the rapists at Petrus's party and Lucy is still 
unwilling to go to the police, Lurie is beside himself with anger and bewilderment. His 
arguments are entirely rational as he points out to her the folly of allowing the men to get 
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away with the rape. She, however, is entirely insensible to his rationality, arguing only 
that he doesn't know what happened and that he cannot even begin to know. Lurie's 
inability to understand his daughter and her unwillingness to provide him with a coherent, 
plausible explanation for her actions shake him considerably and leave them both 
estranged from each other. As for Lucy, she "keeps to herself, expresses no feelings, 
shows no interest in anything around her" (D: 114). She is clearly deeply affected by the 
rape but unwilling to act to bring the rapists to justice. In the face of Lurie's persistent 
pleading that she acts, she simply reiterates that she will not. 
The text draws a clear parallel between Lurie's seduction of Melanie and the more overtly 
violent gang-rape of Lucy. The objectification of woman as body to be used is part of a 
history of sexual violence, and in situations of conflict, women's bodies are frequently the 
casualties, as Horrell (2000) points out in her quotation of one of the testimonies of the 
TRC's "special women's hearings" held in Gauteng (as quoted in Antjie Krog's Country 
of my skull): 
Because always, always in anger and frustration men use women's bodies as a terrain of 
struggle - as a battleground ... behind every woman's encounter with the Security Branch 
and the police lurked the possibility of sexual abuse and rape (p29). 
Despite the way in which he is able to justify his relationship with Melanie, Lurie is 
aware of the violence that is being done to her. His words of seduction are "heavy as 
clubs" (Disgrace: 24); despite her resistance, "nothing will stop him" (D: 25); her only 
response is to "avert herself'. After her rape, Lucy says that: "I am a dead person and I 
do not know yet what will bring me back to life" (D: 161). 
In an interview in Doubling the Point. Coetzee comments on the power or force of the 
suffering body: "If I look back over my own fiction, I see a simple standard erected. 
That standard is the body ... in South Africa it is not possible to deny the authority of 
suffering and therefore of the body" (1992:248). Coetzee's refusal to represent Lucy's 
rape and her dogged silence over it inscribe her body as the site of suffering in a way that 
makes it impenetrable to explanation, thereby heightening its force. The significance of 
the body as a site of suffering can be better understood by considering the way in which 
the body's suffering has been historically constituted. 
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The body, according to Nietzsche, is the basis on which social relations of justice are 
founded. Nietzsche locates the [mythical] origins of culture on a contractual system of 
equivalences which function to regulate social relations. This system of equivalences is 
based on the relation that exists between individuals who are involved in any type of 
contractual relation in which one party is the debtor, and the other the creditor. This 
relation, according to Nietzsche, is grounded on the ability to make promises, on the one 
hand, and the ability on the other hand to enforce the promises made. The body, says 
Nietzsche, functions as the root of the ability to make promises. It is the ultimate 
collateral on which contractual relations are grounded (Grosz 1994: 133) because it is at 
the level of the body that payment can finally and always be extracted. The materiality of 
the body is the guarantee that forms the basis of the relations between promises. 
Promises, according to Nietzsche, depend on the will to remember (Grosz 1994: 131). 
The body is the key to counterforgetfulness because the body can be made to remember 
by pain. Pain is the key term in instituting memory: "if something is to stay in the 
memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory" 
(Grosz 1994:131). The site on which memory is reactivated is the body because the body 
can be made to feel pain. Promises can therefore always be kept, and thus are contractual 
relations enabled. The fOnTIula of the social contract is based on an equivalence bctween 
what is owed and the pain that can be inflicted as payment. The degree of suffering 
becomes commensurate with the degree of pleasure in causing suffering: "the pleasure of 
being allowed to vent power freely upon one who is powerless" (Grosz 1994: 133). 
Punishment is the means justice uses to bind individuals in relations of reciprocity, which 
in turn fOnTIS the cornerstone of justice. 
Kafka's punishment machine in In the Penal Colony is an example of how power is 
enacted on the body. It situates the body as the direct object on which justice is enacted. 
The body is the target of con-elation between the crime committed and the punishment 
exacted: "Whatever commandment the prisoner has disobeyed is written upon his body 
by the Han-ow" (Kafka 1995:144). It is on the body that the force of the legal system is 
focused. According to Foucault, systems of punishment can be situated within a 'political 
economy' of the body, wherein "power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they 
invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to cany out tasks, to perfonTI ceremonies, to 
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emit signs" (Foucault 1979:25). The machine in Kafka's penal colony is the instrument 
wherein these power relations are embedded; its creator, the Commandant, the emblem 
of the varied authorised positions of knowledge on which the judiciary depends: he is 
"soldier, judge, mechanic, chemist and draughts man" (Kafka 1995: 144). By etching the 
sentence directly onto the prisoner's body, the body becomes the literal site on which 
power is inscribed, and the punishment machine the embodiment of the entire legal 
system. Horrell argues that Lucy's body is the terrain on which white South Africa's 
future 'remembering' is ultimately inscribed, in that Lucy's body" ... has been inscribed 
with the guilt of history" and that she "... carries the burden of the hate and its 
inscriptions of shame" (2000:29). 
Within the context of post-apartheid South Africa, Lucy's pregnancy functions as a 
marker of the changing power relations of the country and the way in which punishment 
for past crimes will be exacted. Her body is the site of vengeance and her pregnancy the 
visible sign of vengeance exacted. Lucy's response to her pregnancy, however, can be 
read as an intervention in the cycle of retributive violence in that, despite the conditions 
of its conception, she prepares, against all odds, to love the child. 
Cornwell (2002) argues that there are two ways in which one could interpret Lucy's 
response to the rape. One could either view it as realist or as allegorical. The realist way 
is represented in the novel by Lurie's view of her silence, that she is attempting to make 
reparation for past sins, but that, in doing so, is simply renewing "... the cycle of 
domination and exploitation that has defined the history of South Africa for centuries 
past" (p316). The other way of understanding Lucy's behaviour is to view it as 
allegorical in the sense that it serves as a parable about what it would take to assuage 
white guilt in post-apartheid South Africa (p317). As Cornwell comments: "It is not 
impossible that we are being asked to ponder the wages of white historical sin and 
contemplate the costs of genuine nation healing and reconciliation" (p3J8). 
One way in which to situate Lucy's response to the violence against her is to consider it 
against Coetzee's own comments on the topic of violence: 
Violence, as soon as I sense its presence within me, becomes introverted as violence 
against myself ... Or, to explain myself in another way: I understand the Crucifixion as a 
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refusal and an introversion of retributive violence, a refusal so deliberate, so conscious, 
and so powerful that it overwhelms any reinterpretation, Freudian, Marxian, or whatever, 
that we can give to it. (Coetzee, 1992: 337) 
Magda in In the Heart of the Country, asks "Where, unless compassion intervenes, does 
the round of vindictiveness end?" (HC: 130). Lucy's refusal to hold her rapists 
accountable for their violence and to seek retributive justice cannot genuinely be seen as a 
solution to the question of reparation for past sins, as this would simply fuel the notion 
that vengeance is an adequate response to injustice and that those who have been the 
victims in the past now have the right to become the new oppressors. Yet, this, 
nevertheless, is what Lucy's response seems to suggest, that white South Africans need to 
resign themselves to being punished for past sins and should simply seek an 
accommodation, however humbling, 10 their changed situation. Lucy's absolute refusal 
to explain herself, however, means that she remains impenetrable to any final 
interpretation, so that what is left is simply the figure of Lucy, whose pregnant body bears 
irrefutable witness to the violence done to her. I would therefore suggest that Lucy 
functions as a Christ-like figure whose meaning can be understood as the embodiment of 
unconditional love and forgiveness in the face of immense suffering. 
Lurie considers the impact of the rape and the way in which it has reduced his daughter: 
" ... the story is spreading across the district. Not her story to spread but theirs: they are 
its owners. How they put her in her place, how they showed her what a woman was for" 
(Disgrace: liS). Of her rapists, Lucy says that she thinks that "they are rapists first and 
foremost. Stealing things is just incidental. A side-line. I think they do rape" (Disgrace: 
158). The men who rape Lucy are shown to be possessed of the same type of violent, 
rapacious mentality that underpinned the spirit of colonialism. Woman's body is there to 
be taken and used, in much the same way that land was appropriated. 
The analogy that Lucy uses to describe the sexual act is that of violence and death: " ... 
isn't it a bit like killing'? Pushing the knife in; exiting afterwards, leaving the body 
behind covered in blood doesn't it feel like murder, like getting away with murder'?" 
(Disgrace: 158), The violation of a woman's body is linked thematically to that of death, 
indicative of the ways in which women's bodies have become thing-like. If the post-
apartheid state is in a state of disgrace, then surely it is also the silence around the ways in 
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which women's bodies have been refigured in the post-apartheid terrain that is at issue 
here, so that: " ... over the body of the woman silence is being drawn like a blanket" 
(Disgrace: 110). Lurie is also implicated in this legacy of violence. As Farodia Rasool 
comments at the sexual harassment case against him, he does not seem to accept his 
behaviour towards Melanie Isaacs as one of abuse, nor does he make any mention of" ... 
the long history of exploitation of which this is part" (D: 53). Her comment can be seen 
as a reference to a particular aspect of South Africa's history that of white men seducing 
women of colour with few consequences for them. The fact that both Melanie and Soraya 
appear to be coloured (Soraya's name indicates that she is Muslim; Lurie refers to 
Melanie as 'the dark one') adds to the notion that Lurie's behaviour is doubly oppressive. 
Lurie's seduction of Melanie compromises and makes him complicit in creating a world 
that perpetrates violence against others. In the face of what has happened to Lucy and her 
ensuing silence, he is left defeated: 
Again the feeling washes over him: listlessness, indifference, but also weightlessness, as 
if he has been eaten away from inside and only the eroded shell of his heart remains. 
How, he thinks to himself: can a man in this state find words, find music that will bring 
back the dead? (Disgrace: 156). 
Lurie articulates here the desolation and emptiness of living in a world that seems to be 
bereft of the values that make us human: kindness, caring, compassion for others. It is 
this state of disgrace that is articulated in the novel: the disgrace of living as less than full 
human beings. 
Lurie's Romantic heritage has aided his abuse of one of his charges, the student Melanie 
Isaacs. If Lurie is not an active participant in overt violence, he has nevertheless helped 
create the world in which he lives. The South Africa in which he lives is suffering from a 
malaise that is pervasive and that permeates many aspects of social life. Crime is rampant 
and brutal violence a commonplace. As a father, Lurie has been unable to protect his 
daughter from being raped, and cven though she points out the illogic of his guilt over 
this, he nevertheless feels that he has not fulfilled his duty as a father to her: "'And I did 
nothing. I did not save you.' That is his own confession" (Disgrace: 157). 
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If the redistribution of property is not inscribed by law, it will be gained by other means. 
The most salient consequence of Lucy's rape is the acquisition of land, by Petrus, who in 
all likelihood orchestrated the rape. The seduction of Melanie Isaacs too is enabled by 
David Lurie's position of power. It is the ensuing violence that is made possible by 
relations of power that is at issue here. If Lurie is to reclaim any position of humanity, it 
will have to be in a way that negates self-interest, where notions of power are noticeably 
absent. 
The first sign of Lurie's journey towards redemption is the chamber opera which he plans 
to write on Byron, imagined initially as "a meditation on love between the sexes" (D: 4). 
Lurie's desire to write this chamber opera can be read as an effect of the spiritual and 
psychic emptiness of his life. In explaining his motives to his daughter, Lucy, he 
indicates that there is a need in him to produce something meaningful: "One wants to 
leave something behind" (D: 63). The need to write music can be seen as a need to create 
joy and beauty in an otherwise bleak existence. The chamber opera that he proposes to 
write, however, changes in scope from its inception, so that by the time he gets to Lucy, it 
has gone from being a work that called for "quite lush orchestration" to one that moves 
towards "a very meagre accompaniment - violin, cello, oboe or maybe bassoon" (D: 63). 
The story about the grand themes of love and jealousy, passion and death, changes from 
his stay on Lucy's farm because there is something about it " ... that does not come from 
the heart". Imagined initially as a lush chamber opera, about the passion between Byron 
and a "young, greedy, wilful, petulant" (D: 181) Teresa, Lurie's work on Byron changes 
scope and direction after he returns to Cape Town from the Eastern Cape. Lurie is simply 
unable to write this story any longer. His attention now turns to Teresa as he imagines 
her in middle age, grown unattractive with the passage of time and loss of Byron, "a 
woman past her prime, without prospects, living out her days in a dull provincial town, ... 
massaging her father's legs when they give him pain, sleeping alone" (D: 182). 
When Lurie returns from the Eastern Cape, the young, beautiful and passionate Teresa no 
longer captures his imagination - it is the forgotten and neglected, middle-aged and 
lonely Teresa, who now" ... looks more like a peasant, a contadina, than an aristocrat" 
(D: 181), that engages his attention. Lurie is at first uncertain about whether he has it in 
him to love this drab, ordinary woman, recognizing that responsibility and care for the 
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neglected and discarded have become important to him, because, "If he cannot, what is 
left for him?" (D: 182). It is this story, the one that no one else would care to write, that 
becomes his responsibility. At first, he thinks that he will be able to find music for them 
from amongst the masters, but as he becomes more involved with the middle-aged Teresa 
and the dead Byron, it becomes clear that it will not be sufficient to simply borrow music 
for them, that they are his responsibility. However, once he realizes this, " ... 
astonishingly, in dribs and drabs, the music comes" (D: 183). When the music comes, 
however, it is not the way he had imagined it. He finds the sound of the piano too rich, 
and ends up using a toy banjo that he had bought Lucy when she was a child. To his 
surprise, this seven-stringed banjo fits the mournful Teresa so well that the sound soon 
becomes inseparable from her. 
When Lurie reflects on the way in which the chamber opera has changed, he realises that 
he too has become something different to what he had imagined himself to be. His 
responsiveness to the voices of anguish mark this change in him, so that he becomes 
consumed by the plaintive yearnings of Teresa and tries to give her, through his music, 
the fulfilment that she longs for and that the dead Byron is no longer able to provide for 
her. Teresa's pathos is that she is still full of love and passion for Byron, but he is dead 
and no longer responsive to her, and this is the source of her anguish - " ... complex 
proteins swirling in the blood ... as the soul hurls its longings to the sky" (D: 185). Lurie 
reflects that this is what Soraya and the others were for, to relieve him of his yearning and 
desire, so that he could be left " ... clear-headed and dry" (D: 185). Teresa, on the other 
hand, suffers because she has no way of relieving her longings. When she calls out to the 
dead Bryon, his only response is: "Leave me, leave me, leave me be!" (D: 185). Yet, 
Byron's seduction of the young, 18-year old Teresa ignited a passion " ... that kept Teresa 
howling to the moon for the rest of her natural life in a fever that has set him howling too, 
after his manner" CD: 186). Into this pitiful situation Byron's young daughter, Allegra, 
neglected and unloved by him, also enters, beseeching him to come and fetch her. Thus, 
in the aftermath of the horror of the attack on him and Lucy, David Lurie finds himself 
open and receptive to the voices of the injured and violated. 
Lurie's care of the dogs is another way in which this receptiveness to the violated is 
illuminated and that enables him to begin to develop a space for himself that will, in some 
measure, restore a sense of grace to an existence that has become irredeemable. The post-
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apartheid state, the background against which Disgrace unfolds, heralds an historical 
moment of fragmentation and disintegration of both self and other in its pervasive 
violence, and Lurie's care and responsibility for dogs a radical alterity is an attempt to 
imagine a space in which humanity can be restored. 
David Lurie's journey to his daughter's smallholding in the Eastern Cape can be seen as 
the beginning of his journey of psychic renewal, but it involves progression through a 
despair and bleakness hitherto unparalleled in his life. Bev Shaw, a friend of Lucy's who, 
along with a few volunteers, runs an animal refuge clinic from the premises of the Animal 
Welfare League, a charity organisation that has since closed down, develops a 
significance for Lurie that becomes part of the change that envelops him. She is 
described as being physically unattractive to him, a "dumpy, bustling little woman with 
black freckles, close-cropped, wiry hair, and no neck" (D: 72), someone who does not 
appeal to him because "He does not like women who make no effort to be attractive" (D: 
72). Further acquaintance with her only reinforces his initially negative impression of her 
- her house smells of animals, there are cats everywhere, and the furniture and ornaments 
are tacky. This is not the kind of woman with whom Lurie would ordinarily even 
consider having a sexual relationship, seduced as he is by physical beauty, so that: 
"Never did he dream he would sleep with a Bev" (D: 149). That he finds Bev Shaw 
undesirable is clear when she is lying under the blanket ready for him to make love to 
her, he reflects that, "Even in the dimness there is nothing charming in the sight" (D: 149). 
Yet, his relationship with Bev is part of the process in which he comes to acknowledge 
those who would conventionally be considered unattractive and undesirable. As he 
comes to adjust to a life and values very different to those of his past, so too he comes to 
inhabit and understand the world of those pushed to its margins. 
It is the development of this consciousness of the other that constitutes the beginning of 
Lurie's redemption. The theme of the seWs relation to the other is a constant one in 
Coetzee's work, but it is particularly the development of feelings of sympathy and caring 
for the other that marks Coetzee's protagonists. This is clearly reflected in other works 
(as we have seen), and also in Elizabeth Costello (2003) and Coetzee's memoir, Boyhood 
(1998). When she is asked to account for her beliefs, Elizabeth Costello, in Lesson 8 (At 
the gate), replies that she is a secretary of the invisible, a phrase borrowed from the poet, 
Czeslaw Milosz. Her role as a writer is simply to write down what she is told, testing the 
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words to ensure that she has written them correctly. What she does, essentially, is make 
visible those who had previously been invisible - the downtrodden and ignored, the 
murdered and violated. However, she cautions her listeners that she will write for 
whoever calls to her, be it the murdered or the murderer, because, as she puts it, the guilty 
suffer too, crying out: "Do not/orget me!" (Coetzee, 2003:204). 
In Boyhood, the young John finds the responsibility of caring for those whom others 
consider irrelevant and inconsequential falling on his shoulders. Aunt Annie, his great-
aunt and godmother, is taken to hospital with a broken hip after she falls on the steps of 
her flat in Rosebank. Aunt Annie lives alone and is described in terms that evoke pity 
and sadness - the nursing sister comments that when she was brought in to the hospital, 
her toenails were" ... as long and black as birdc1aws" (Coetzee, 1995: 115). To the young 
John she is a figure of disgust - old, wrinkled, ugly, nearly blind. When they visit her in 
the hospital all he want is " ... to be gone, to be out of this place and never to come back" 
(Boyhood: 116). He finds her flat, where they go to spend the night, equally repulsive -
there is no fridge, her larder is sparsely stocked with old, mouldy food, the toilet is 
discoloured with dirt, and the light is dim because Aunt Annie uses only 40-watt bulbs in 
order to save on electricity. He is, however, fascinated by the storeroom, which contains 
shelves full of the same book, written by Aunt Annie's father, Balthazar du Biel, called 
'Deur 'n gevaarlike krankheid to ewige genesing'. The book, an account of his boyhood 
in Germany, was a complete commercial failure, frequently lapsing into a narrative of 
madness, with "... lights in the sky and voices speaking to him out of the heavens" 
(Boyhood: lIS). Aunt Annie, however, has devoted much of her life and money in trying 
to get the book sold, going from door to door herself when the bookshops refused to sell 
it. When she dies, there are only five mourners at her funeral. As for the fate of the 
books, his mother is unable to tell him when he enquires about it. Despite the child-like 
repugnance that he feels for the pitiful Aunt Annie, he acknowledges a responsibility 
towards her that recognises her significance in the face of society's turning away. Where 
no one else will do so, he feels the burden of making her life something that matters: 
... and now Aunt Annie is lying in the rain waiting for someone to find the time to bury 
her. He alone is left to do the thinking. How will he keep them all in his head, all the 
books, all the people, all the stories? And if he does not remember them, who will? 
(Boyhood: 166). 
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Lurie's project with the dogs at the welfare clinic is largely free of the self-interest that 
colours conventional 'good' deeds. As for the work that Bev does, Lurie is unmoved "I 
just find it hard to whip up an interest in the subject" and somewhat sardonic: " ... to 
me animal-welfare people are a bit like Christians of a certain kind. Everyone is so 
cheerful and well-intentioned that after a while you itch to go off and do some raping and 
pillaging. Or to kick a cat" (Disgrace: 73). His attitude suggests a scepticism and irony 
towards this type of sentimentality. He later hints that one of the reasons for his 
scepticism is the suspicion that people who engage in acts of charity and kindness do so 
out of guilt or the fear of retribution, whereas he would rather that, " ... if we are going to 
be kind, let it be out of simple generosity ... " (D: 74). When Lucy suggests that he 
volunteers to help Bev at the clinic, he is sceptical because such acts of charity have 
overtones of doing penance for past sins. He concedes to doing it on the condition that it 
is done without ulterior motives, because he is not interested in doing penance: "I am not 
prepared to be reformed" (D: 77). 
From the outset he is resistant to working at the Animal Welfare League as "reparation 
for past deeds". He will do it on condition that he doesn't have to "become a better 
person" (Disgrace: 77). If Lurie achieves a form of grace through his involvement with 
dogs, it is precisely because he has not sought it, because he has resigned himself to living 
in a state of disgrace. Ironically, it becomes increasingly evident throughout the novel 
that Lurie does change, albeit against his will and without his understanding. 
Lurie's care of the dogs signals what Michael Marais refers to as the beginnings of "self-
substituting responsibility", a "form of responsibility that ... involves a sacrifice of self, a 
substitution of self for the Other" (Marais, 200 I: 10). What enables violence to be done to 
others is the inability to imagine the 'other', to identify with the other. In Disgrace, post-
apartheid South Africa is defined as a space where identification with the 'other' is 
notably absent - hence the abuse of Melanie and the rape of Lucy. According to Marais, 
"relations at all levels of South African society lack respect for the otherness of the other" 
(Marais, 2000:58). Disgrace examines the consequences of this lack of identification 
with the other and posits violence as its principal result. Marais (2002) argues that this 
absence enables both Lurie's violation of Melanie and the more violent gang-rape of 
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Lucy, and that post-apartheid changes have not changed this aspect of social relations in 
any fundamental way (pS9). 
It is in the light of this notion that Lurie's care of the dogs must be read. If certain groups 
have been rendered historically 'other', then non-humans inhabit a space that is radically 
'other'; dead ones even more so. If Lurie comes to accept responsibility for maintaining 
the dignity and honour of dogs that are already dead, it is because he has learned to love 
and care for the 'invisible' the least and most insignificant of all. 
In a society where dogs have, in certain instances, been trained to attack black people, 
what purchase do they have to be treated humanely? References about dogs are 
disdainful throughout the text: "They are part of the furniture, part of the alarm system" 
(Disgrace: 78); the building that houses the Animal Welfare League "is a place not of 
healing ... but of last resort" (D: 84). The dogs in Lucy's kennels are all shot during the 
attack on her. If Lurie gains redemption through his relationship with animals in the 
novel, then it is because they represent the limits of empathic imagination. In the face of 
utter negation and emptiness, Coetzee finds a position from which to begin to re-imagine 
a space where living is possible, where the idea and reality can be combined. 
In the attack on Lurie and his daughter, the dogs are treated with indifference and 
contempt, shot with a seeming lack of feeling - one is left to die slowly with a gaping 
throat-wound, the remaining three are as casually dealt with: "Taking his time between 
shots, the man picks them off' (D: 96). 
Lurie's turn to dogs can be read as a turn to that which is least important, which others 
have discarded: "On the list of the nation's priorities, animals corne nowhere" (D: 73). 
Without understanding how or why, he develops a feeling of responsibility for these 
creatures that defy rational explanation: " . .. suddenly and without reason, their lot has 
become important to him" (D: 126). The two sheep that Petrus brings home for the 
party are left to graze on a bare patch of ground, and Lurie becomes so annoyed at this 
that he moves them to where the grass is more abundant. Lurie's reflections on the sheep 
evoke the horror of the lives of animals, where the sheep "exist to be used, every last 
ounce of them, their flesh to be eaten, their bones to be crushed and fed to poultry" (D: 
123). He reflects further that perhaps their souls reside in their gall bladder, the only part 
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of them that probably doesn't get eaten because no one will eat it. When he complains to 
Lucy about the propriety of bringing the sheep to mingle with the very people who will 
eat them later, she admonishes him for his inappropriate sensitivity, sharply reminding 
him that they are now in the country. He, however, is not convinced that it is just a matter 
of practicality: "indifference, hardheartedness" (D: 125) that is his opinion. He even 
contemplates buying the sheep from Petrus in order to save them from being eaten, but is 
defeated by the logistics of what to do with the sheep afterwards and the sure knowledge 
that they will simply be replaced by two more sheep. He would like to save the sheep 
that Petrus has bought to slaughter for his party, but recognises that, ultimately, it will not 
matter, that the violence done to the sheep are so deeply embedded in society'S relations 
to animals that saving them would be a lost cause. 
Why the welfare of the sheep should matter to him is something he does not understand: 
A bond seems to have come into existence between himself and the two Persians, he does 
not know how. The bond is not one of affection. It is not even a bond with these two in 
particular, whom he could not pick out from a mob in a field. Nevertheless, suddenly and 
without reason, their lot has become important to him. (D: 127) 
When he tries to explain his feelings to Lucy, he is unable to do so coherently: 
"Nevertheless, in this case, I am disturbed. I can't say why ... I never imagined I would 
end up talking this way" CD: 127). When he is handed a plate at Petrus's party with two 
mutton chops, he has to eat it for the sake of courtesy, but tells himself that he will ask for 
forgiveness afterward. 
What motive Lurie offers for his work with the animals, particularly once they are dead, 
is that he does so for his idea of the world. This attitude or philosophy reflects Lurie's 
need to act with integrity and decency in the face of a negation of values of caring and 
compassion, a need to find redemption from the wretchedness of the situation. Lurie 
recognises the practical uselessness of what he does - there is no valid reason he can 
think of to justify what he does, yet he finds himself compelled to act in a way that will 
honour the dogs' corpses. Theodor Adorno indirectly provides some insight into Lurie's 
behaviour. According to him (as quoted in Graham), 
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The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in [the] face of despair is the 
attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of 
redemption ... (2000: 10) 
Therefore, despite the fact that what he does has no discernible benefit, his need 
nevertheless to do so reflects his desire for redemption. When Lurie visits Melanie's 
father, George Isaacs, he tells him that he is not a believer, but that he accepts disgrace as 
his state of being as punishment for what happened between himself and Melanie. When 
he asks whether living in disgrace without term is enough of a punishment, George Isaacs 
responds by telling him that because he does not pray, he has no way of asking God, so 
" ... God must find his own means of telling you" (Disgrace: 172). 
The Penguin English Dictionary defines 'grace' as: unmerited divine assistance given to 
human beings for their regeneration or sanctification. According to Derek Attridge 
(2005), "Lurie's phrase 'state of disgrace' clearly evokes the theological notion of a 
'state of grace', the name for a condition of receptiveness to the divine" (p182). 
According to Juan Luis Segundo (1980), the word 'grace' came to designate the reality of 
Christianity as a result of Paul's conversion, in that it was the name that he used most to 
describe the reality of his life after his conversion (p4). The word 'grace' thus has its 
roots in attempts to express a new reality, this new reality being that of Christianity. In 
terms of its etymology, 'grace', according to Segundo, comes from the Latin gratia and is 
a translation of the Greek term charis, which connotes benevolence and also has the 
meaning of gratitude in its Greek usage. An equivalent of the Greek word charis is found 
in the Old Testament in the Hebrew word Qim, which refers to the benevolence of a 
superior toward an inferior. In the Book of Wisdom, this benevolence is shown toward 
the lowly and wretched; thus "we see an equivalence being established between grace 
and mercy" (Segundo, 1980: 5). 
When Paul uses the word 'grace' in his letters, he means essentially "the new reality that 
Christ brought into the world (Segundo, 1980:8). In providing a definition of what 
precisely this new reality is, Segundo quotes from Rousselot, who says: 
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Saint Paul seems to see grace, above all, as a divine aid whieh heaven grants out of pure 
merey. It heals our wounded will, changes it, and draws it away from evil to good ... 
(1980:8) 
Segundo argues that Paul chose the term grace to depict the new reality of Christianity 
because of this particular meaning attached to it, that it was assistance or help granted 
"out of pure mercy". It was thus Paul's insight that his encounter with Christ on the road 
to Damascus that led to his conversion was a gift from God and had nothing to do with 
anything he had done. 
It can be argued, therefore, that the inexplicable feelings of care and concern for animals 
that Lurie develops can be seen as an answer to his (unarticulated) desire for 
'regeneration or sanctification'. The change that comes over him points us also, however, 
in the direction of a type of love typified by Jesus Christ. Dostoyevsky's writings in his 
notebook, as quoted by Judith Gunn, demonstrate this: 
'To love your neighbour as yourself, according to Christ's commandment, is impossible. 
The law of personality on earth prevents it. The f prevents it. [And yet] Christ alone was 
able to do it, but Christ is eternal, an etemal ideal toward which man aspires and is bound 
to aspire according to nature's law. And yet after Christ's appearance as an ideal man in 
the flesh it became clear as daylight that the highest and last development of personality 
must (at the very end of its development, at the very point of achieving its goal) reach the 
point at which men will find out, realize and beeome convinced, utterly convinced, that 
the greatest use a man can make of his personality, of the fullest development of his I, is 
in one way or another to destroy this I, to give himself up wholly to all and everyone, 
selflessly and wholeheartedly. And that is the greatest happiness' (1990:92). 
Lurie does not achieve a state like that described above. However, it can be argued that, 
during the course of the novel, he moves ever closer towards a state in which he begins to 
give himself up to others, to put their needs above his own. Lurie's redemption is that he 
develops feelings of love and empathy for those who are regarded as insignificant and 
unimportant - the middle-aged, widowed Teresa, the two sheep that Petrus brings home 
for the slaughter, the abandoned Katy, the dead animals. It is clear that Lurie is not 
interested in penance, that he has no intention of helping Bev with the dogs as expiation 
for his sins. However, during the cOurse of the novel he does begin to change, 
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unexpectedly and inexplicably. The catalyst for this change can be seen in the work that 
he embarks upon with Bev at the animal refuge clinic, a place described as one" ... not of 
healing ... but of last resort". He soon discovers that one of the tasks Bev has set for 
herself is that of helping the animals to die with gentleness and care when there is no 
longer any hope for them. 
The first day he is there a woman brings in a goat that is horribly injured (one half of its 
scrotum is swollen and discoloured, the other half is caked with blood and dirt; when 
Bev tries to clean it the wound is swarming with white grubs), can barely walk and is 
beyond saving. Despite entreating the woman to leave the goat with her so that she can 
ease it into death with drugs, the woman takes the goat with her when she leaves. Bev is 
deeply affected, hiding her face from Lurie and blowing her nose. She is clearly 
disturbed at the prospect of the further suffering that the animal will have to endure. 
When Lurie asks her whether she minds being the one who has to put the animals down, 
her response is sharp: "I do mind. 1 mind deeply. 1 wouldn't want someone doing it for 
me who didn't mind. Would you?" (D: 85). 
Despite the fact that Lurie had generally considered himself somewhat indifferent to 
animals, the killings that he and Bev Shaw have to perfonn leave him deeply disturbed -
one Sunday he is so overwhelmed by the sadness that he has to stop driving and pull over 
to the side of the road while "Tears flow down his face that he cannot stop; [and] 
his hands shake" (D: 143). 
Lurie does not understand what is happening to him, but he recognises that part of his 
distress stems from the sheer horror of the situation. The dogs that he and Bev Shaw put 
to death are killed simply because they are unwanted - "too menny" (D: 146). Coetzee's 
use of this phrase deepens the horror, evoking as it does the note written by little Jude in 
Thomas Hardy's Jude the Obscure, in which the boy kills himself and his two younger 
siblings by hanging, leaving a note that reads, simply, "Done because we are too menny" 
(1998:336). The boy had committed this appalling act because of their desperately 
poverty-stricken situation, when he was moved to uttering: 
I think that whenever children be born that are not wanted they should be killed directly, 
before their souls come to 'em, and not allowed to grow big and walk about! (1998:336). 
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However, it is not the fact that Lurie helps put the dogs to death in a merciful way that 
lifts his actions above the ordinary; it is the fact that he intervenes once they are dead, 
beyond caring for. Lurie deliberately does not take the dogs' corpses to the incinerator 
immediately after they have been killed (on a Sunday), because they would stay there for 
the rest of the weekend with aIJ the refuse from the hospital, and "He is not prepared to 
inflict such dishonour upon them" (D: 144). Even there, he does not simply leave the 
corpses to be incinerated; he takes on this responsibility himself because the dogs would 
often not be disposed of properly because their legs, because of their stiffening due to 
rigor mortis, would get caught in the bars of the trolley, and they would come riding back 
on the trolley. As a result of this, the workmen would resort to beating the bags with the 
backs of their shovels to break the limbs and make them easier to dispose of. Lurie has 
no rational explanation for why he does this, but it is precisely this lack that makes his 
actions redemptive; he does it "For his idea of the world, a world in which men do not 
use shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for processing" (D: 146). 
Disgrace suggests that it will take an extraordinarily radical act to redeem the 'disgrace' 
of the dishonourable space that Lurie inhabits. It is only" ... once they are unable, utterly 
unable, to take care of themselves," that Lurie takes over. He does what no one else is 
prepared to do: in ensuring that the dogs' corpses are disposed of in as dignified a way as 
possible, Lurie shows an imaginative identification with the 'other' that represents the 
extreme of the limits of empathic imagination: the radical alterity of the dogs' corpses is 
transfigured by his act from Other into Self. It is by learning to love that which does not 
matter, the least little thing, that Lurie gains a measure of redemption for himself. 
According to Boehmer, in an essay on Benjamin's Passagen-Werk, Coetzee implies that 
". .. it is through a 'great love' alone, an unstintinting, self-emptying love, that the 
recognition of the other's pain is achieved (2000:343). Michiel Heyns argues that the 
closing of the novel signals a form of redemption in that, in Lurie's relationship with 
dogs, he discovers what it is to love and be loved, and yet, also, what it is to sacrifice the 
loved object (2002:64). 
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The change that Lurie undergoes is what Boehmer refers to as: "The surrender of self 
through empathy" (2002:346). Gareth Cornwell argues that, in Disgrace, it is the failure 
to empathise, to identify with the other and the "refusal to acknowledge the seWs 
necessary passage through the other" (2002:315) that is the novel's key concern. This 
imaginative identification with the other is the focus of Lesson 3, entitled 'The lives of 
animals' in Elizabeth Costello. Attwell (1999) argues that, in this text, the key concern is 
moral salvation, " ... saving ourselves from our own cruelty" (p 1). In this section of the 
novel, Elizabeth is invited to deliver a speech at Appleton College and chooses as her 
topic the subject of animals. One of the themes that she discusses is the ability to 
empathise. She uses the context of the Holocaust death camps to illustrate the point that 
evil results through an inability to empathise, arguing that: "The horror is that the killers 
refused to think themselves into the place of their victims ... " and that human beings 
possess the ability to imagine what others feel, through "The heart [which] is the seat of a 
faculty, sympathy, that allows us to share at times the being of another" (Coetzee, 
2003:79). This sensitivity to otherness is, according to Attwell, a "". hallmark of all 
Coetzee's writing", and it is only through a confrontation with the "". ordinary, pitiful 
alterity of a living being ... that we can begin to understand what it means to be 
responsible" (1999:2). 
Elizabeth Costello's fame as a novelist rests largely on her book, The House on Eccles 
Street. In this book, she writes about a fictional character, Marion Bloom, created by 
another writer, James Joyce. She argues that the fact that she was able to think her way 
into the existence of someone who never in fact existed proves the point that" ... there is 
no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another" (EC: 80). 
The faculty of sympathy, however, is founded upon feeling, rather than rational 
knowledge, which, Elizabeth argues, is inherently disrespectful to the other, because "It 
implies that a living being that does not do what we call thinking is somehow second-
class" (Elizabeth Costello: 78). According to this view, it is the privileging of 
instrumental reason that allows violence to be done to others. Because animals lack 
rational thought, it is assumed that they are lesser beings, yet Elizabeth contends that all 
animals, including ourselves, are full of being, which she describes as the feeling of 'joy'. 
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Thus, she says that: "To thinking, cogitation, I oppose fullness, embodiedness, the 
sensation of being ... a heavily affective sensation ... of being alive to the world" (EC: 
78). It is writers and poets, she argues, who are able to think themselves into the being of 
the other, who can provide us with a different kind of insight into the other's being. As 
an example she quotes a poem about a jaguar, by Ted Hughes. She argues that the 
jaguar's consciousness is qualitatively different to ours, that it is kinetic rather than 
abstract. Hughes is able to penetrate the jaguar's consciousness because he is prepared to 
imagine a way of being-in-the-world different to the one we would normally inhabit, one 
in which it is not the mind, but rather the body, that produces consciousness. Elizabeth 
Costello argues that what a poet like Ted Hughes does is to " ... show us how to bring the 
living body into being within ourselves" (EC: 98), and that this enables us to imagine 
ourselves, albeit for a short while, as the jaguar. 
Ultimately, however, there is little agreement or consensus between her and her audience, 
and the talk she delivers in the second part of Lesson 4, 'The poets and the animals', ends 
unpleasantly, with her estranged from the reasoning of those justifying the killing and 
eating of animals, so that "That is the note on which Dean Arendt has to bring the 
proceedings to a close: acrimony, hostility, bitterness" (EC: 112). At the end of Lesson 
4, Elizabeth is left alienated and defeated. Her views on the ethics of using animals for 
practical purposes leave her increasingly marginalized, and her pain and anguish 
contribute to the overall tone of desolation that this section of the novel embodies. Her 
sense of horror at what is done to animals and, in particular, the casualness with which it 
is done, sets her apart from those around her, so that her alienation seems to mirror the 
gulf that separates humans from animals. In this way, Elizabeth comes to embody the 
animals whose rights she defends. The pathos of her plea to her son, John, that she 
simply cannot come to terms with what happens to animals and the anguish this produces 
in the face of others' indifference is heartrending and, although she is left feeling 
estranged and bewildered, she nevertheless leaves behind a sense of the horror of the 
situation. 
In Lesson 5 of Elizabeth Costello, entitled 'The Humanities in Africa', Elizabeth's sister, 
Blanche, or Sister Bridget, as she is now called, argues that the study in humanities 
entered the university via textual scholarship, which was centred on the Bible. The aim 
of these studies was on uncovering the true teachings of Jesus, in particular, rebirth and 
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resurrection. The whole constellation of studies that now constitutes the humanities, from 
linguistics and literary studies to cultural and historical studies, thus had their origin in 
coming to understand the true teachings of Jesus, in general, and the meaning of 
redemption, in particular. According to Sister Bridget, the purpose of the studies in 
humanities was that of "finding the True Word, by which they [the founding fathers] 
understood then, and I understand now, the redemptive word" (EC: 122). 
Sister Bridget goes on to argue that contemporary studies in humanities have lost their 
way from this ideal and have therefore lost their raison d'etre, making them superfluous. 
She argues with Elizabeth that what now stands as meaning in the humanities is a secular 
vision of salvation: "Rebirth without the intervention of Christ" (EC: 133). Her response 
to this is that it is not possible: " ... it cannot be done" (p 133). 
In a conversation with the Goodwins, a couple at the dinner following her speech, 
Blanche argues that the writers who interested her and her fellow students the most were 
those who, like DH Lawrence, promised some form of salvation; that, " ... in our truest 
reading, as students, we searched the page for guidance, guidance in perplexity" (EC: 
127) and that it is that craving, essentially " ... a quest for salvation" (p 127), that the 
humanities must respond to if it is to remain viable. 
The most haunting and evocative figure in Lesson 5, however, is that of Joseph, who used 
to be employed at Marianhill to do carvings and other odd jobs, but who was now retired 
due to arthritis in his hands. He shows Elizabeth the carvings he used to do in his 
workshop, all of them of Jesus on the cross. All the carvings are the same, that of the 
suffering Jesus on the cross, differing only in size, and there are a great many of them in 
the workshop-· hundreds, an identical. Elizabeth is somewhat surprised that Joseph 
carves only this. To her question of why he carves, his response is simply: "For Jesus ... 
Yes. For Our Saviour" (136). When Elizabeth expresses her misgivings to her sister 
about the sensibility of someone carving only one thing, and that a man in agony over and 
over again, and that it represented such a waste of his talents not to expose him to other 
art forms, Blanche responds that Joseph had essentially dedicated his life to representing 
Jesus in his suffering on the Cross, that his dedication had been absolute and true, and that 
this faithfulness was surely more noteworthy than the ways in which other people spent 
their lives. 
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In this story, Joseph, with his ruined hands and excess of crucifixions, in the ceaseless and 
faithful toil of his carvings, represents the true meaning of dedication to Christ. This 
image of Joseph is such a powerful one because it evokes the image of Christ, suffering in 
his quest for the salvation of mankind. And it is this suffering that Jesus underwent that 
makes him such an icon, because his suffering echoes the suffering of people the world 
over, the reality of life in which suffering occurs daily and unremittingly. Blanche argues 
that this is what makes the force of Jesus so potent, why he is chosen as the one in whose 
footsteps others must follow. This, according to Blanche, " ... is why African people 
come to church to kneel before Jesus on the cross, African women above all, who have to 
bear the brunt of reality. Because they suffer and he suffers with them" (EC: 141). 
To the extent that Elizabeth contests this notion of Christ's suffering as man's salvation in 
favour of a reading that emphasises the joy and beauty represented in the Greek ideals 
and myths, it is noteworthy that she comes to the conclusion that in order to understand 
true compassion and love in the face of suffering and pain one would have to turn to the 
Christians. 
Dissatisfied with the way in which her visit to her sister ends, she writes a letter to her in 
which she demonstrates the way in which images from the Greeks create a world in 
which humanity's beauty is revealed. In writing the letter, she relates a story of the pain 
and suffering of Mr Phillips, a friend of her mother's, whom she visits in the final stages 
of his illness. Wasting away as he is, she decides to do something for him that will bring 
some kind of release from the perpetual pain, and decides, while posing for him, to take 
off her top and expose her breasts to his gaze. This, she argues, is what it means to 
perform an act of humanity: "Nothing compels us to do it ... But out of the overflow, the 
outflow of our human hearts we do it nevertheless: drop our robes, reveal ourselves, 
reveal the life and beauty we are blessed with" (EC: 150). It is this kind of joyous beauty 
that we have taken from the Greeks and that is what constitutes what we can learn from 
the humanities that makes it superior to the endless suffering of Christ that the Christians 
offer. 
This is the way her letter to her sister ends. Were the story to end this way, however, it 
would certainly prove her point that the humanities inherited from the Greeks teach us the 
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sublime beauty of mankind and that this makes it the more significant force. However, 
Elizabeth goes on to relate the rest of what happened between her and Mr Phillips 
something she cannot tell her sister because it would not convey what it is she wants to 
prove about the Greeks and their gift to humanity. What she does not relate is that what 
she does for Mr Phillips is something that goes beyond merely offering beauty in the face 
of unrelenting suffering, and she is convinced that recourse to the Greeks is not possible if 
she is to explain it in its fullness: 
As for her, Elizabeth, crouched over the old bag of bones with her breasts dangling, 
working away on his nearly extinct organ of generation, what name would the Greeks 
give to such a spectacle? Not eros, certainly too grotesque for that. Agape? Again, 
perhaps not. Does that mean the Greeks would have no word for it? Would one have to 
wait for the Christians to come along with the right word: caritas? 
For that, in the end, is what she is convinced it is. (EC: 154) 
To explain what she does for Mr Phillips would need something beyond what the Greeks 
had to offer. Elizabeth finds the word to describe her actions, caritas, the Latin term for 
divine love, more appropriate even than agape, or Christian love, because what she did 
seems to transcend the boundaries of merely acting charitably or with caring towards 
one's fellow being. In choosing caritas she indicates that her actions related to or 
proceeded from God. At the end, then, she indicates, love originates from and is made 
possible only by God. 
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VI: Conclusion 
In this dissertation I have argued for an understanding of selected 1M Coetzee fiction that 
goes beyond the more conventional categories of postcolonial analysis to one that 
considers the way in which his work is also inforn1ed by a dimension that can be defined 
as one denoting religious or spiritual concerns, particularly those of redemption and 
salvation. I have focused on two earlier and two later texts in order to show that these 
concerns constitute an on-going theme in Coetzee's work. To this end I have considered 
the ways in which In the Heart of the Country (1977), Life and Times of Michael K 
(1983), Disgrace (1999) and Elizabeth Costello (2003) can also be considered as texts 
that are concerned with issues transcending those of its particular socio-historical 
conditions. 
While Coetzee's work is largely informed by issues of colonialism and imperialism, and 
is therefore particularly engaged with South African concerns, there is also an element in 
his writing that moves beyond this toward an engagement with issues of a more 
metaphysical nature. The worlds that Coetzee's characters inhabit seem at times to be a 
kind of hell from which they desperately try, at some point, to escape. In each of the texts 
that 1 have considcred, there is a longing to transcend the earthly reality that the 
characters experience. Magda's yearning for love and a sense of community and her 
desperate need to live in reciprocity with others expose the way in which certain historical 
conditions create relations of alienation and estrangement amongst human beings. Her 
refusal to accept the conditions of her existence and her repeated attempts to change the 
structures that govern her life is an indication of her need to transcend the boundaries of 
her life. However, her eventual turn toward the sky-gods can be read as a result of her 
failure to find redemption from her situation, so that at the end of the novel she is back to 
being the dutiful daughter of the colonies, looking after her father. This reading of her 
fate, however, would be an incomplete one. As she herself comments at the end of the 
novel: "I am corrupted to the bone with the beauty of this forsaken world" (He: 139). 
While Magda's material conditions never in fact change, she has nevertheless created a 
world in which a different reality is imagined and thereby made possible. She is thus able 
to articulate a certain victory at the end, so that she is able to say that "I have uttered my 
life in my own voice throughout (what a consolation that is), I have chosen at every 
moment my own destiny ... " (HC: 139). Her desire and longing for a different world, 
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while defeated at the end, has nevertheless been imagined and articulated, and in this way 
made to matter. 
Michael K's quest to live free from the historical and political times he inhabits is a quest 
to live in a pocket outside of time. His resistance to living according to the social norms 
of the time and his determination to stay out of the camps, in addition to the harelip that 
marks him physically, make him a figure of anomaly. This desire to live outside of time, 
in as natural a way as possible, so that he lives off the bounty of the land, can be read as a 
desire to live in a timeless eternity, a pastoral fantasy of heaven. Rita Barnard (2002) 
argues that Life and Times of Michael K is a challenge to the family farm as understood 
within South Africa's settler-colonial history, in that it presents" ... a vision of rural life 
without patriarchal or colonial domination", and that the country in this text functions as a 
place of refuge from the civil war that is going on (p389). Ultimately, however, K is 
unable to remain in the countryside and returns to Sea Point and has to endure the 
sordidness of city life, where he meets up with a group who befriends him and gives him 
alcohol and where one of the women makes love to him, despite him trying to push her 
away, so that when they leave he feels" ... the shame of the episode with the girl waiting 
like a shadow at the edge of his thoughts ... " (LTMK: 179). Coetzee does not allow 
Michael K to emerge as a figure of sacredness, untainted by the world around him, 
rooting him firmly instead in the realities of life in a city ravaged by war. Throughout the 
text, though, Michael K demonstrates a way of being that is somehow not of this world, 
that is above and beyond the cares and concerns of his world, and it is this yearning 
towards transcendence that lends Life and Times of Michael K an otherworldliness, an 
impulse towards what, it can be argued, represents a type of religious feeling. 
The word 'grace' is embedded in the title of Coetzee's second Booker Prize-winning 
novel, Disgrace, and is a significant aspect of the novel in its evocation of the notion of 
grace within the tradition of Christianity. In this text, disgrace functions as a catch-all 
term for depicting life and events within a particular historical moment. The theological 
notion of 'grace', however, signals a moment of redemption from the wretchedness 
depicted in this novel. Despite winning Coetzee his second Booker Prize, Disgrace has 
been the subject of much bitter criticism, facing accusations ranging from racism and 
fuelling white paranoia to contributing to a climate of hopelessness and despair about the 
new South Africa. The charge of racism is suitably dealt with by David Attwell in his 
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article "Race in Disgrace". The sense of bleakness and despair resonates deeply, 
however, in this novel. This could be simply because Coetzee seems prepared to engage 
more assiduously than other writers with the harder issues of the 'miracle' of South 
Africa's transformation. Interestingly in this context, Coetzee defines grace elsewhere 
as: "a condition in which the truth can be told clearly, without blindness" (Coetzee, 1997: 
392). The term 'grace' can thus be seen to function in more than one sense in this text. 
My focus in this dissertation has been on the way in which the notion of 'grace' can be 
understood in Disgrace as exemplifying the notions of redemption and salvation. I have 
argued that, in this text, Coetzee seems to be feeling his way towards a resolution that is 
increasingly distanced from that of the human condition towards one which suggests, 
albeit tentatively, that under certain conditions salvation is possible only with the 
intervention of the divine. The change that comes over David Lurie during the course of 
this novel represents the hope that humanity can always be saved. Like Paul on the road 
to Damascus, he recognises, however, that the change that comes over him has nothing to 
do with anything he has done, that it comes inexplicably and without understanding. I 
have argued here that the change that comes over David Lurie can be understood as the 
intervention of grace. 
Elizabeth Costello deals more overtly than Coetzee' s other texts with religious questions, 
particularly that of Christianity. In Lesson 5 - 'The Humanities in South Africa', she and 
her sister, Blanche, stage a debate about the merits of different belief systems, with her 
arguing passionately against Blanche's choice of Christianity as the more significant 
force. However, she is forced to concede, albeit to herself only, that the notion of love as 
understood within the tradition of Christianity, surpasses any other that she can think of. 
In Lesson 3, which deals with the issue of animal ethics and rights, she is a figure of 
inconsolable grief and anguish at living in a world that seems so far removed from her 
understanding. Her vegetarianism is, according to her, a quest to save her souL Her 
sensibilities seem to make her world a hellish kind of place in which she is increasingly 
estranged from the people around her, even those whom she loves, and reveal impulses 
that have their deepest meaning in theological, not literary or political terms. 
The metaphysical impulses that I've identified in JM Coetzee's novels have, in my 
opinion, not been sufficiently noted before. Yet, it is this dimension to his work that is 
what, in conjunction with his reading and understanding of the political and historical 
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milieu, makes JM Coetzee the great writer that he is. While Coetzee's work has been 
noted for the richness of its contributions to the field of postcolonial studies, there is a 
quality of elusiveness to his writing that makes it difficult to pin down and fully 
appreciate or understand. At least in part, this elusiveness can be accounted for by an 
impulse in Coetzee's characters toward transcendence of the conditions of their existence. 
The contradictions between Coetzee's political/historical/postcolonial concerns and the 
metaphysical impulses that I've identified add a complexity to his writing that leaves 
many questions unanswered. However, as this is a mini-dissertation, I have been 
constrained in how many of these possible questions I can actually address. 
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